Team Redstone's Role in Operation
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
INTRODUCTION
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait during the early morning hours of 2 August 1990 initiated a chain of events leading to the largest deployment and subsequent combat use of Army missiles in U.S. history. Backed by the United Nations (U.N.) as well as the combined might of a 28-member coalition, the United States drew a "line in the sand" in defense of Saudi Arabia and for the liberation of Kuwait. Supporting this action, known to the world as Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS), was the technological and logistical know-how of the Army elements located at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.
Virtually every one of the Army's fielded missile systems managed and supported at Redstone Arsenal were sent to Southwest Asia (SWA). Three general types of missiles were deployed: air defense (AVENGER, CHAPARRAL, STINGER, HAWK, and PATRIOT); antiarmor (DRAGON, TOW [tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided], HELLFIRE, and SHILLELAGH); and artillery (HYDRA-70, MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System], and the Army TACMS [Army Tactical Missile System]). Of these systems PATRIOT, DRAGON, HELLFIRE, HYDRA-70, MLRS, TOW, and the Army TACMS were fired in combat. The lack of targets was the primary reason that most of the air defense systems were not employed.
The U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) also supported other systems such as the Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designator (G/VLLD), the Mast Mounted Sight (MMS), the M-901 Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV), the Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR), and various night sights that provided coalition forces with a night-fighting capability not available to the opposing Iraqi army. In addition, "the extremely accurate laser guided bombs that were so effective during the air war were a modern version of a concept that came out of MICOM's [Research, Development and Engineering (RD&E) Center]...more than 25 years ago."
The military and civilian personnel assigned to the Program Executive Offices (PEOs) at Redstone and to MICOM shared in the success of the coalition soldiers who fought to free Kuwait from Iraqi domination. Without the technical and logistical expertise of the organizations located at the arsenal, the operational readiness of the systems deployed in support of ODS would have been impossible to maintain. "Getting equipment ready for deployment,...upgrading systems, filling unit repair parts shortages, arranging shipment, expediting deliveries, and speeding up procurements were among the tasks accomplished."
The Persian Gulf theater of operations posed a number of production, acquisition, spare/repair parts supply, and maintenance challenges for the MICOM/PEO community. The harsh desert climate and the logistical immaturity of the theater of operations were the two biggest factors impacting the operational readiness of the sophisticated missile and rocket systems deployed to SWA by the Army. But Operation Desert Storm also provided a unique opportunity to see how well the Army's inventory of advanced weapons functioned in actual combat conditions.
This short narrative describes the weapon systems deployed to SWA and the support provided to keep these systems functioning at required levels of performance throughout the conflict. It also examines the moral support given not only to Redstone Arsenal soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf but to family members left behind. The challenges met, the successes achieved, the obstacles overcome, the lessons learned are all significant parts of Redstone Arsenal's role in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
CHAPTER I
COMMAND ADMINISTRATION
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION
The Army commands currently located on Redstone Arsenal are the successors of earlier Army missile activities at the same location. Programs related to missiles and rockets supplanted the original chemical munitions manufacturing operations for which the arsenal was initially constructed in World War II. In addition to MICOM and the PEOs for Air Defense and Fire Support, today Redstone houses the U.S. Army Test, Measurement, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) Support Group, the U.S. Army Ordnance Missile and Munitions Center and School (OMMCS), the U.S. Army Information Systems Command (ISC)-Redstone, and the U.S. Army Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC). Other tenant activities of the arsenal include the Medical and Dental Department Activities (MEDDAC/DENTAC) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC).
During the period between 2 August 1990 and 8 March 1991, MICOM was organized with a command group; two major centers--the Missile Logistics Center and the RD&E Center--and several directorates. Included among the latter organizations were the Weapons Systems Management Directorate (WSMD), the Missile Systems Readiness Directorate (MSRD), the Procurement Directorate, the Resource Management Directorate (RMD), the Intelligence and Security Directorate (ISD), the Information Management Directorate (IMD), the Personnel and Training Directorate (P&TD), the Product Assurance Directorate (PAD), and the Security Assistance Management Directorate (SAMD).
The Missile Command's assigned mission is to exercise integrated systems acquisition and commodity management of missile and rocket systems and other assigned materiel, and to provide for a rapid transition during mobilization to the sustainment and support of combat forces while accelerating the development and acquisition processes. The command also executes the Security Assistance and Logistics Assistance programs in accordance with Department of the Army (DA) and U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) guidance.
In addition, MICOM develops and acquires non-major systems and equipment within assigned areas of responsibility; provides functional support to the Air Defense and Fire Support PEOs and their respective project managers (PMs); and conducts basic and applied research and engineering and advanced development in related technologies. Other assigned missions include maintaining the mobilization capabilities necessary to support the Army in emergencies; exercising command, control, and supervision of assigned activities and the installation; improving productivity and the quality of life of soldiers, family members, and civilian employees; and providing support to U.S. Army National Guard and Reserve units and personnel.
The Missile Command manages or supports all of the Army's missile and rocket systems. Although it manages some systems totally--such as HAWK, CHAPARRAL, FAAR, and LANCE--most of the systems are developed, procured, and managed through production by the PEOs for Air Defense and Fire Support located at Redstone Arsenal. Established in May 1987, the PEOs represent assigned programs to DA Headquarters (HQDA), the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. They also interface with the combat developer to ensure the user's requirements are considered in programmatic issues. Such projects as HELLFIRE, PATRIOT, Army TACMS, TOW, MLRS, AVENGER, and STINGER are managed and supported by MICOM only after they are completely fielded. Systems not fully fielded are managed by the PEOs.
The Missile Command also directs a number of combat optics systems and combat laser systems including the MMS, the G/VLLD, and night sight systems. In addition, MICOM is responsible for research and development (R&D) and weapons systems modifications. It also serves as the worldwide distributor for parts and components for all of the Army's missile systems.
FUNDING (Not including contributions by PEOs for Fire Support or Air Defense)
The FY 1990 budget for MICOM totaled $1.6041 billion,while the FY 1991 budget was $1.6127 billion. During FY 1990, MICOM obligated $8.8 million in support of ODS, or 5.48 percent of its annual budget. The Missile Command diverted funds from other activities to cover these costs. In FY 1991, MICOM obligated $215.3 million, or 13.35 percent of its annual budget, in support of ODS. These FY 1991 obligations were appropriated as follows: Operation & Maintenance, Army, $65.1 million; Procurement Appropriations, $34.5 million; and Army Stock Fund, $115.7 million.
The Missile Command did not receive a supplemental appropriation for FY 1990 in support of ODS. Based on requirements submitted by MICOM in November 1990, AMC established an initial supplemental appropriation of $66.8 million for the command's FY 1991 ODS support. With the cessation of hostilities on 28 February 1991, AMC reevaluated the requirements and reduced the supplemental estimate to $48.7 million. As of 15 May 1991, MICOM had received $48.2 million of the $48.7 million identified in the supplemental estimate.
The MICOM Army Stock Fund Consumable (ASF-C) obligation authority (OA) funding program for FY 1991 was jeopardized because of a lack in OA for ODS. The Missile Command decided to use normal operating peacetime program authority for award of ODS contractual requirements. The latter were initiated and awarded based on estimates that the war would last an extended period of time (i.e., 120-day war). Based on guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), funding of total ODS requirements was not provided. The Missile Command began action in late FY 1991 to obtain additional OA.
The exhaustion of peacetime operating OA caused the ASF-C program to cease obligations except for high priority requirements and contracts with legal ramifications. Missile Command analysts pointed out to higher headquarters that the impact to readiness and stock availability of this temporary stoppage, combined with the danger of not receiving any additional funding, were factors that could be significantly detrimental in future conflicts.
PERSONNEL
The mobilization for ODS hit MICOM at a time of great turbulence for the command's personnel. A major reduction in force (RIF) had been announced in the spring of 1990, and the command was reassigning personnel to fill the available spaces to reduce the impact of the RIF on the community and the command. As of 31 July 1990, MICOM's baseline strength was 7,313 civilians and 504 military (191 officers, 25 warrant officers, 288 enlisted). A significant adjustment to these figures occurred between 5 and 7 December 1990 when 54 MICOM employees retired, including 38 who took advantage of the Voluntary Early Retirement Authority. Three other major adjustments to the command's personnel figures were made as employees of the PEOs and PMs were realigned out of MICOM's total strength.
The first major change occurred on 27 November 1990 when 503 civilian employees were realigned out of MICOM to reflect their work for the PEOs and PMs. On 4 December 1990, another 128 civilian spaces were handed off to other organizations. The last realignment of personnel between MICOM and the PEOs and PMs was completed on 31 January 1991 when 66 military personnel (49 officers, 1 warrant officer, 16 enlisted) were eliminated from the MICOM table of distribution and allowances (TDA).
During the Gulf conflict, the Missile Command was authorized to hire up to 42 temporary civilians, although it actually hired 24. These individuals were used as backfills for permanent employees directly supporting ODS. These temporary hires were used in engineering, public affairs, equipment specialist slots, and secretarial/clerical spaces.
The command's end personnel strength as of 6 March 1991 was 6,495 civilians and 441 military (160 officers, 28 warrant officers, 253 enlisted). The military strength included 11 Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) officers, 8 IMA warrant officers, and 3 Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) officers.
Reserve component officers and warrant officers were used to augment MICOM's military strength to meet the needs of the expanded mission requirements for ODS. The reservists were selected for several key roles at MICOM, including shift chief and other operations staff for the Emergency Operations Center (EOC); senior readiness officer (SRO) in SWA; operations officer for the Missile Logistics Center (MLC); project officer for improving the operational readiness of the M-901 ITV to DA standard; logistics assistance representatives (LARs); and mobilization planners.
A limitation in personnel experienced by MICOM as a result of ODS involved OMMCS, a tenant activity at Redstone Arsenal. At the onset of the Persian Gulf conflict, the Army-wide drawdown of skilled personnel from OMMCS removed many of the school's core instructor personnel. Concurrent with this drawdown, OMMCS was being pressed to qualify more soldiers in its various areas of specialization. To meet the later requirement, OMMCS requested Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel to fill its depleted instructor ranks. However, those IRRs called to active duty required skill qualification testing to determine refresher training requirements before they could be employed as instructors.
Although the school was not a MICOM activity, the delay in processing IRRs as "Instructor Qualified" had a brief ripple effect on the MICOM community. The command later suggested that a partial way to alleviate the delay in providing needed instructors was the creation of a core of IMA soldiers trained and qualified to assume OMMCS instructor slots with minimal need for refresher training.
CHAPTER II
COMMAND AND CONTROL
The MICOM Emergency Operations Center
Following the invasion of Kuwait, the Chief of the MICOM Plans and Operations Office extended the hours of the EOC on 2 August 1990. Initially, the office fielded numerous telephone calls about MICOM managed and supported systems sold to Kuwait which probably had been captured by the invading Iraqi army. By 6 August 1990, EOC operations were being conducted on a 24-hour basis and it soon became apparent that additional personnel would be needed.
In response to the escalating situation in the Persian Gulf, BG Larry R. Capps, MICOM Deputy Commanding General (DCG), formally ordered the activation of the MICOM EOC effective 7 August 1990. COL James D. Amato, MICOM Chief of Staff, assumed operational control of the EOC on that date. Later that same day, MICOM transmitted the activation message to AMC Headquarters and the other AMC major subordinate commands. This message established the MICOM EOC as the focal point for all Mideast-related actions.
A similar Defense Data Network (DDN) message was transmitted to the MICOM community, notifying all command elements and Redstone Arsenal tenants that the MICOM EOC would be the point of contact (POC) for all Operation Desert Shield taskings and information requests from higher headquarters or other commands and activities. After holding coordination meetings with the Emergency Action Officers for MLC, SAMD, and MSRD, the EOC issued a second DDN message on 7 August reiterating the requirement that all OSD actions and taskers be reported to the EOC for tracking purposes.
Initially the MICOM EOC was staffed with only the full-time personnel of the Plans and Operations Office, Military Personnel, Services, and Emergency Operations Division, Personnel and Training Directorate. A core group of eight employees staffed the EOC just as it had done during Operation Just Cause (20 December 1989 to 26 January 1990). It was soon obvious, however, that more manpower would be required for Operation Desert Shield. On 8 August 1990, MLC provided coordination personnel for three shifts. The following day, MSRD provided employees for 24-hour operations.
A subsequent analysis of staffing and the current level of activity indicated that additional EOC support might be required. Consequently, the EOC transmitted a DDN message to the MICOM community on 11 August 1990 advising all command elements to be prepared for imminent execution of the MICOM Headquarters EOC Plan. Staffing was set at a level 1 emergency in support of Operation Desert Shield, and the heads of the major organizational elements were directed to ensure that recall and standby rosters were current before providing copies to the EOC.
The Missile Command implemented a modified level 1 staffing on 12 August 1990, with an effective date of 13 August 1990. Refinements to the staffing matrix resulted in the MICOM EOC organization. This organization remained in effect for the duration of ODS. The cessation of hostilities and subsequent retrograde operations in March 1991 allowed the MICOM EOC to reduce its staffing levels. Military personnel serving as Operations and Readiness Officers assumed shift chief duties from personnel provided by MLC who returned to their former positions.
On 9 August 1990, an AMC message established the requirement for a daily situation report (SITREP) to be transmitted via the Secure Command Operations Reporting and Exercise (SCORE) system. The SITREP began on 10 August 1990 and was issued daily for the duration of ODS. The SCORE system was used not only to transmit the daily SITREP but also served as the primary method of communications between the command and the MICOM Senior Command Representative (SCR) in SWA.
Although the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) and DDN were available to both the MICOM EOC and MICOM SCR in SWA, the AUTODIN was frequently backlogged or unavailable while the DDN was used in an unclassified mode only. Because the majority of transmissions to and from the MICOM EOC were classified, the SCORE system was brought on-line early in the deployment process and became the backbone of the command and control process. Secure voice and secure fax provided backup for the SCORE system. The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) was not fully utilized because of system downtime, lack of authorized and trained operators, and complicated operating procedures.
Daily briefings to the MICOM Commanding General and the PEOs began on 13 August 1990. They consisted of an operational update which included deployments, equipment densities, and readiness rates; a logistics update; and an update on taskers and significant issues. Briefings focused on MICOM personnel deployed to SWA (primarily LARs, contractor field support representatives, and contractors) began on 14 August 1990. Two briefings a week replaced the daily briefings in December 1990. The format was also standardized to include weapon systems updates which focused on system assessments, current equipment status, current Class IX supply status, current Class V supply status, and significant issues and problems.
The Missile Command coordinated control of pertinent command issues in SWA through its SCR. This MICOM representative in the theater of operations was assisted by the SRO and a readiness officer. These officers served as major liaison points between MICOM and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT), commands at lower echelons, and MICOM in-country personnel.
PEOs for Air Defense and Fire Support
With the mobilization of U.S. forces into SWA, the Air Defense PEO and its project offices immediately began providing maximum support to deploying air defense forces. The bulk of hands-on activities during the entire buildup and conflict centered in the PATRIOT and STINGER Project Offices. The PEO for Air Defense was closely involved in the development and execution of decisions by those organizations concerning the acquisition, deployment, and sustainment of their respective air defense weapon systems. The PEO staff, which had little direct involvement with the weapon systems, assisted the PMs in funding and acquisition activities. They also kept the Program Executive Officer and his deputy accurately informed on the status of air defense actions in SWA.
The PEO for Fire Support played a major role in supporting ODS. From surging and accelerating equipment and supply production deliveries to sending Quick Reaction Teams to deploying sites, Fire Support personnel provided the assistance necessary to get the job done. In addition, the PEO helped the MICOM EOC on a daily basis in its round-the-clock operations where management of all Fire Support missile systems was greatly intensified. As a result of these actions, DA presented the PEO for Fire Support with a Commendation for Extraordinary Meritorious Service in Support of Operation Desert Storm.
CHAPTER III
MISSILE & ROCKET SYSTEMS DEPLOYED TO SOUTHWEST ASIA
OPERATION DESERT STORM STRATEGY
In the moonless early morning dark of 17 January 1991,eight AH-64 APACHE helicopters belonging to the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) sped across the border into Iraq and launched laser-guided HELLFIRE missiles against two early-warning ground control radar sites. Using night vision goggles and Forward-Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) capability to maneuver in complete darkness, "Task Force Normandy successfully provided a `radar-black corridor' to initiate the air campaign" against Iraq. The APACHEs' HELLFIRE missiles and 2.75- inch HYDRA-70 rockets, fired at precisely 0238, completely destroyed the Iraqi radar sites within 4 minutes. These opening shots of the coalition air way marked the beginning of the "Desert Storm" that would ultimately succeed in driving Iraq out of Kuwait.1 The strategy developed primarily by GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command during Operation Desert Storm, was based on the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine which originated in 1981. The basic principles of this doctrine emphasized initiative, agility, synchronization, and depth. To neutralize the enemy's identified "center of gravity," strategists had to exploit the weaknesses of the opposing force while reinforcing there own strengths through the coordinated use of naval forces,mobile land troops, air superiority, and control of communications and intelligence gathering systems. The coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait was "an effective demonstration of the successful application of the principles of AirLand Battle... ." The aim of the air war phase of Operation Desert Storm was to seize control of the skies within the theater of operations thereby helping to ensure "the destruction of [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein's offensive military capability." The U.S., British, Saudi, and Kuwaiti predawn sorties of 17 January 1991 targeted Iraq's airfields, air defense network, and command-and- control centers. During the first 14 hours of the air war, 18,000 tons of explosives were unloaded during the more than 500 combat sorties flown. An impressive 80 percent of these initial combat missions were considered successful. Between 17 January and 28 February 1991, over 116,000 allied air combat sorties were flown. In addition to the aforementioned targets, these round-the- clock air strikes destroyed fixed-site missile launchers, bridges, artillery, supply lines, nuclear research facilities, chemical weapons factories, biological warfare production plants, utilities, communication systems, and key government buildings. Iraqi ground troops and support facilities also suffered the demoralizing and deadly effects of constant bombardment. Along with various munitions, coalition aircraft also dropped about 14 million leaflets urging Iraqi soldiers to surrender and explaining the procedure for doing so. Although the air campaign dramatically began the isolation and destruction of the Iraqi forces inside Kuwait, allied air power alone was not sufficient to dislodge the troops and tanks dug into defensive positions along the border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq or inside the occupied territory. However, by destroying the Iraqi high command's ability to adequately communicate with its troops or to effectively monitor the coalition's preparations for a ground offensive, the air campaign allowed allied forces to execute the final moves of the detailed strategy designed to liberate Kuwait and "...to deny Iraq the ability to conduct offensive operations for at least a decade." The air war's success in eliminating much of the threat posed by Iraqi artillery and reducing the military effectiveness of Iraq's front line troops also helped to contain the number of casualties suffered by allied forces during the ground war. In keeping with the principles of AirLand Battle doctrine, General Schwarzkopf devised a ground war plan by which the U.S.-led coalition would outflank, encircle, then destroy "...the offensive capability of the Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations." Using a diversionary frontal assault and a classic "Hail Mary" football play type of maneuver, the allied forces launched a massive, undetected rear armor assault on 24 February 1991 which totally confounded and cut off the Iraqi army in Kuwait. By 28 February, the so-called "100 Hours War" quickly completed the liberation of the emirate and forced Iraq to accept U.N. cease fire terms as well as the Security Council resolutions passed since the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. On 7 March 1991, CENTCOM estimated Iraqi losses as a result of Operation Desert Storm as follows: 36 fixed-wing aircraft and 6 helicopters in air-to-air engagements; 68 fixed- and 13 rotary-wing aircraft destroyed on the ground; 137 Iraqi aircraft flown to Iran; 3,700 of 4,280 battle tanks (86 percent); 2,400 of 2,870 other armored vehicles (84 percent); 2,600 of 3,110 assorted artillery pieces (84 percent); 19 naval ships sunk and 6 damaged; and 42 divisions made combat- ineffective. The U.S. forces released over 70,000 captured Iraqi prisoners of war to Saudi control. Estimates of Iraqi combat casualties ranged from 25,000 to 100,000. Deaths among non-combatants in both Iraq and Kuwait were also estimated to be in the thousands.
High Technology Warfare
During the days preceding the escalation of Operation Desert Shield into Operation Desert Storm, speculation was rampant about the cost in American lives of forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Private analysts in the United States estimated that American troop casualties could range from a low of 500 to a high of 30,000. Based on the results of mock battles against replicas of Iraqi fortifications and other frontal assault training exercises, U.S. military experts calculated that anywhere from one-third to one-half of ground troops could be killed. In late January 1991, Army commanders in Southwest Asia warned combat doctors about the possibility of a projected 10 percent casualty rate over a 30-day period. Estimates for the wounded fluctuated from a low of 2,500 to more than 16,000.
The Iraqi government and media tried to exploit American fears about high casualties. An editorial published on the front page of the ruling Baath Arab Socialist Party newspaper in early January 1991 claimed that, "The American president is still deluded by the paper calculations drawn by the Pentagon that he can control the theater of operations....The price which Bush will pay is not only the U.S. defeat and the loss of U.S. strategic interests, but rivers of Americans' blood." Less than a week before the U.N. deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein made a speech in Baghdad denigrating U.S. military capabilities: "The Americans will come here to perform acrobatics like Rambo movies. But they will find here real people to fight them.... They think that the Iraqi command has weak nerves and that the Iraqis will be shaken. We are a people who have eight years of experience in war and combat.... All the technological advancement will be tested on the battleground. They will see how their weapons will be shot down.... They will see how the Iraqis--men, youngsters and women--will fight them should they attempt to land anywhere in Iraq."
Contrary to Iraqi rhetoric and braggadocio as well as the pessimistic probabilities of homegrown prognosticators, the actual numbers of U.S. casualties and wounded in action were astonishingly albeit gratifyingly low. By the end of Operation Desert Storm, American troops had suffered 148 battle deaths, 145 non-battle deaths, and 467 wounded in action.
Of course, a lot of credit for these minimal figures must be given to the well-trained, highly motivated soldiers who successfully executed the devastatingly thorough AirLand Battle strategy mapped out by the allied command. But without the sophisticated weaponry available to coalition strategists and soldiers, this highly effective plan of action would probably not have been drafted. The U.S.military establishment's faith in the efficacy of "high-tech" weapon systems was vindicated during Operation Desert Storm. The accuracy and lethality of the precision munitions fired at or dropped on Iraqi troops and targets during the air war were not only incapacitating but demoralizing. The heavy artillery barrage and aerial bombardment of Iraqi defensive positions along the Saudi border and inside Kuwait just before "G-day" on 24 February 1991 further weakened the military effectiveness of these troops. This in turn lessened the danger faced by coalition forces during the opening moves of the ground offensive. "Smart" weapons also proved themselves against Iraqi tanks, armored vehicles, other hardened targets, berms, other types of fortifications, and Scud missiles. Of all the U.S.-made weapons deployed in SWA, however, none proved to be more reliable or effective than those Army missiles, rockets, and other systems managed and supported by the organizations located at Redstone Arsenal , Alabama.
Redstone Arsenal Weapon Systems in Southwest Asia
Virtually every one of the fielded Army missile systems managed and supported at Redstone Arsenal were sent to SWA. Three general types of missiles were deployed. Among the air defense systems sent to the Persian Gulf were CHAPARRAL; HAWK; STINGER in its manportable, AVENGER, and Air-to-Air STINGER (ATAS) configurations; and PATRIOT. Of these systems only the PATRIOT was fired in combat during Operation Desert Storm. Kuwaiti air defense units fired HAWK missiles during the Iraqi invasion on 2 August 1990. However, the coalition's command of the skies over Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait after the beginning of the air war on 17 January 1991 eliminated targets for the other U.S. Army air defense missile systems deployed in SWA.
Most of the antiarmor missiles dispatched to the theater of operations "...performed very well" during the conflict. These systems included DRAGON, HELLFIRE, SHILLELAGH, and TOW in both its airborne and ground configurations. Only the SHILLELAGH was not used in combat during Operation Desert Storm. All of the artillery missile systems sent to SWA, including Army TACMS, HYDRA-70, and MLRS, were fired during both the air and ground offensives. HYDRA- 70 rockets were among the opening shots of the first air strike against Iraq on 17 January 1991. Both the MLRS and Army TACMS, two systems which made their combat debut in the Persian Gulf War, "...performed superbly."
The Missile Command also supported other systems such as the G/VLLD, the MMS, the M-901 ITV, the FAAR, and various night sights that provided coalition forces with a night-fighting capability not available to the opposing Iraqi army. In addition, "the extremely accurate laser guided bombs that were so effective during the air war were a modern version of a concept that came out of MICOM's [RD&E Center] ...more than 25 years ago."
Missile Descriptions and Use in Southwest Asia
The "...stellar performance of [the] Army missiles in Southwest Asia" made many of these weapon systems household words not only in the United States but in countries all over the world. Some of the missiles even acquired popular nicknames indicative of their effectiveness against Iraqi troops and missiles. The PATRIOT missile was dubbed the "Scud buster" because of its impressive record of highly visible Scud missile kills. Captured Iraqi soldiers referred to the MLRS as "steel rain" because of the destruction inflicted by the rockets' individual bomblets as well as for the heavy barrages' psychological impact on effected troops. The following descriptions of the systems deployed to SWA and their use in combat (if any) demonstrate why in the months preceding the outbreak of hostilities, "both the Army and defense analysts [expected] the weapons to be devastatingly effective against Iraqi tanks and aircraft."
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The Army TACMS Block I, a replacement for the LANCE missile system, is an inertially-guided missile with a range of more than 100 kilometers. A precision munition, the Army TACMS has more than 900 high explosive, fist sized bomblets that detonate on contact. Fielded with MLRS units, the missile is fired from the same launcher. Army TACMS is designed to destroy tactical missile launchers; suppress air defense; attack command, control, and communication sites; and disrupt logistics. The Army TACMS Block II is a candidate system to fill the requirement to destroy enemy armored combat vehicles at long ranges. |
Army TACMS |
One of the outstanding success stories of ODS, fielding of the Army TACMS was accomplished ahead of schedule in August 1990 using the initial operational test and evaluation (IOTE) unit, the 6/27th Field Artillery (FA) Battalion from Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The unit was initially deployed to SWA with the XVIII Airborne Corps, but A Battery, one of the unit's two Army TACMS-capable firing batteries, was later placed under the operational control of VII Corps. It was this battery which on 18 January 1991 launched the first two Army TACMS missiles ever to be fired in combat.
Production of the system was accelerated in order to meet the ODS requirement. A total of 105 Army TACMS missiles were deployed to SWA, 32 of which were successfully fired against surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, logistics sites,artillery and rocket battery positions, and tactical bridges. According to LTG Thomas J. Kelly, Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Army TACMS in SWA was "...spectacularly successful. We...[used] it in certain efforts which [were] extremely high priority. It ...really delivered."
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A mobile light air defense system with a turret mounted on a tracked vehicle carrying four ready- to-fire missiles, the CHAPARRAL is a ground launched version of the air-to-air SIDEWINDER. CHAPARRAL is the Army's standard, short range, low altitude air defense system which provides point defense of vital corps areas against direct air attack. It homes in on the heat given off by the target aircraft's engine exhaust and is used against helicopters and low flying fixed-wing jets. Although U.S. forces have never fired this missile in combat, the system has been successfully used under such conditions by allies of the United States. |
CHAPARRAL |
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A manportable, shoulder fired, antitank missile, the DRAGON has a medium range of about 1,000 meters and weighs about 35 pounds. In addition to tanks, the DRAGON can be used against gun emplacements and fortified positions.The system consists of an expendable round and reusable tracker with a day/night sight. It is deployed in airborne and infantry divisions, both light and mechanized; armored cavalry and Ranger regiments; and special forces. The DRAGON is used by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps as well as about 14 foreign countries. The system is co-produced with Switzerland. The prime contractor is currently replacing the basic warhead with a new, more lethal design. The improved system is called DRAGON II. |
DRAGON |
Of all the MICOM-supported systems deployed during the Persian Gulf conflict, the DRAGON was one of the most criticized by both defense analysts and Army officials. The three areas of most concern were the difficulty encountered when aiming; exposure of the gunner to enemy fire; and the missile's inability to penetrate the better layered or newer reactive modern armor. But as David G. Harris, MICOM Public Affairs Officer, pointed out in an interview with The Wall Street Journal in February 1991, "...it is all we have, and we believe it will do the job against the armor we'll see in the Gulf." Although considered to be "a weapon of last resort," a few DRAGONs were fired during combat in SWA.
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The HAWK is a medium range, surface-to-air guided missile that provides air defense coverage against low- to medium-altitude aircraft. It is a mobile, all-weather day and night system. The missile is highly lethal, reliable, and effective against electronic countermeasures. Basic HAWK was developed in the 1950s and initially fielded in 1960. The system has been upgraded through a series of product improvements beginning with Improved HAWK in 1970. The Phase III product improvement and the latest missile modification are currently being fielded to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The U.S. Army National Guard as well as 20 allied nations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and several countries in both SWA and Southeast Asia (SEA), are also equipped with the HAWK system. |
Although HAWK missile batteries were deployed by the U.S. Army during the conflicts in Vietnam and SWA, American troops have never fired this weapon in combat. The first combat usage of HAWK occurred in 1967 when Israel successfully fired the missiles during the Six Day War with Egypt. Even though it was not used by the coalition during Operation Desert Storm, the HAWK missile system did see action during the Persian Gulf War. Kuwaiti air defense units equipped with U.S. HAWK antiaircraft missiles downed about 22 Iraqi aircraft and one combat helicopter during the invasion of 2 August 1990. The system later posed a possible threat to the U.S.-led coalition because Iraqi forces captured both HAWK and TOW missiles in Kuwait.
In January 1991, the official Iraqi news agency claimed that two of the captured HAWK batteries were operational, while three others would be combat ready later that month. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was reportedly told by his military chiefs that, "Our fighters are now ready to use [the captured HAWK batteries] against the planes of invasion and aggression in order to make their weapons backfire with the determination derived from your own." Although MICOM officials initially believed that Iraq would be too unfamiliar with the system to be able to use it, later there was speculation that "...Iraq may have gained its expertise from captured Kuwaiti soldiers...."
Regardless of Iraq's stated plans to employ U.S.-made missiles against the U.S.-led coalition, MICOM spokesman Dave Harris noted: "Our guys know what the capabilities of the HAWK are and the capabilities of Basic TOW are and what they should do if they are used against them. We have known since August the Iraqis had captured Hawks and TOWs in Kuwait, and we've done what had to be done to make sure people knew what the capabilities of those systems are."
Actions to counteract this threat were implemented at the start of Operation Desert Shield. Because the HAWK was vulnerable to American electronic warfare systems, the U.S. Air Force reprogrammed the missile jammers on its aircraft to thwart Iraq's attempted use of the captured HAWKs. About 90 percent of this software modification was completed within 48 hours of the aircraft's arrival in Saudi Arabia, with all being upgraded within 72 hours of landing. In addition, aircraft radar warning receivers were enhanced to accommodate HAWK radar signals. Because of the HAWK's distinctive radar signature, any Iraqi efforts to train on the captured systems were expected to be immediately visible to watching allied forces. This "Blue-Gray" threat--so-called because it is posed by "a U.S. or allied-produced weapon in the hands of the adversary"--was one which U.S. military officials were confident could be successfully counteracted.
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HELLFIRE is an air-to-ground missile system designed to defeat tanks and other individual targets while minimizing the exposure of the launch vehicle to enemy fire. HELLFIRE uses laser guidance and is designed to accept other guidance packages. It is used on helicopters against heavily armored vehicles at longer standoff distances than other Army missiles now in the inventory. Current launch platforms include the AH-64 APACHE helicopter and the Navy AH-1W. The system is also qualified for use on the UH-60 BLACKHAWK, and has been tested for use on the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and the ITV. |
As previously mentioned, the first shots of Operation Desert Storm occurred on 17 January 1991 when eight APACHE helicopters used HELLFIRE missiles and HYDRA-70 rockets to destroy two Iraqi early-warning ground control radar sites. However, this was not the first time that HELLFIRE missiles had been fired in combat. Over a year before, U.S. Army troops successfully used HELLFIRE against seven targets during Operation Just Cause in Panama.
"One of the Army's premier antitank weapons systems," an estimated 2,900 to 4,000 HELLFIRE missiles were fired during Operation Desert Storm, 80 to 90 percent of which were judged to have hit their target. The system proved itself to be very effective against a variety of moving and stationary targets, including tanks (APACHE helicopters destroyed over 50 Iraqi tanks in one battle alone), other armored vehicles, radar sites, bunkers, and other fortified positions.
HELLFIRE missiles were also unintentionally involved in several "friendly fire" incidents during Operation Desert Storm. Of the 148 Americans killed in combat in SWA, 35 died as a result of fratricide. Because "the Hellfire can operate at longer ranges than [APACHE pilots] can identify [targets]," pilots were unable at times to distinguish between Iraqi and coalition forces thereby increasing their chances of inadvertently causing the death of a fellow soldier. To reduce such incidents in future conflicts, the Army is now studying several options for identifying future ground vehicles.
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An unguided air-to-ground rocket which uses a variety of warheads, the 2.75-inch HYDRA-70 rocket system is fired from helicopters by the Army and from both jets and helicopters by the Air Force and Navy. The current version has a new rocket motor, new warheads, and other improved components that greatly enhance the system's performance. Rockets have been bought by Japan, Pakistan, Jordan, Kenya, Egypt, Taiwan, and Honduras. Launchers have been sold to El Salvador, Korea,Thailand, Jordan, and Egypt. |
Literally millions of these munitions were fired in Vietnam. Helicopters armed with HYDRA-70 rockets were also deployed in Operation Just Cause as well as ODS. The APACHE helicopters that opened the air campaign by destroying two radar sites inside Iraq with HELLFIRE missiles also used HYDRA-70 rockets which "...hit and scattered thousands of razor-sharp flechettes" across the sites. The 2.75-inch munitions also proved useful during the ground phase of the Gulf War. Members of the 2d Battalion, 229th Attack Helicopter Regiment from Fort Rucker, Alabama, used primarily 30-mm chain guns and 2.75-inch rockets against the fortified positions and large bunker complexes they encountered during the second day of the ground offensive.
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The MLRS is a large (13-foot) unguided artillery rocket mounted on a tracked mobile launcher. Each launch vehicle carries two clusters of six rockets--called "six packs" by U.S. soldiers--all of which can be fired in less than 60 seconds. The MLRS warhead contains 644 high explosive grenades for antipersonnel and light vehicle engagement. Alternative warheads now in development include the Sense & Destroy Armor (SADARM) and the Terminally Guided Submunition (TGSM). |
The rocket has a range of over 30 kilometers. As it nears the target, the rocket warhead splits open, ejecting grenades which fall to earth in a pattern and detonate on contact. This weapon is effective against troop concentrations, trucks and other unarmored vehicles, storage sites, and enemy weapons emplacements. The MLRS launcher is also used for the Army TACMS and the Ground Launched Tacit Rainbow, a cruise missile used against enemy radars. The governments of Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France are currently participating in production of MLRS launchers and basic rockets in their nations for fielding to their respective forces.
Like the Army TACMS, MLRS was first fired in combat during Operation Desert Storm. The system's initial trial by combat occurred on the evening of 13 February 1991 "somewhere near the Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait tri-border area..." when the 21st Field Artillery's Alpha Battery engaged in an artillery raid on targets in southern Iraq. The battery was used as a single firing unit, with all 10 of its MLRS launchers lined up along a 3-kilometer stretch. During the fight, more than 100 rockets were fired on several enemy positions in less than 1 minute.
During the course of the Persian Gulf conflict, Alpha Battery fired 550 rockets, the second highest MLRS battery in total missions and total rockets fired. The top MLRS battery in SWA was A Battery, 1st Battalion, 158th Field Artillery (MLRS), Oklahoma Army National Guard which fired 699 rockets during the raids and actual ground war. In all, U.S. Army artillery units fired over 17,000 MLRS rockets against Iraqi howitzer and rocket battalions, air defense artillery (ADA) battalions, command and control facilities, and logistics facilities. The MLRS proved to be "...extremely effective and very dependable..." throughout the conflict in SWA. The overall success of this system in combat was succinctly characterized by the VII Corps Artillery Commander when he stated,"MLRS is gangbusters."
British forces also fired the MLRS in combat for the first time during Operation Desert Storm. According to LTC Peter Williams, Commander of Britain's 39th Heavy Artillery Regiment in Saudi Arabia, "It's the decisive battle winner. We call ourselves the Grid Square Removal System because the rockets from each launcher can take out a square kilometer of the map." Perhaps the most telling moniker attached to this weapon system during the Persian Gulf crisis, however, was that coined by the Iraqi troops who had to endure long hours of bombardment by coalition MLRS units. Captured Iraqi soldiers referred to the grenades dispersed by the MLRS as "steelrain." The deadly downpour rapidly dampened the Iraqi will to fight, helping to blast a significant psychological breach in Iraqi defensive positions in Kuwait. This mental opening ultimately translated into droves of Iraqi soldiers who voluntarily surrendered rather than endure further punishment from the MLRS maelstrom.
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PATRIOT is the U.S. Army's newest, most advanced air defense system. Capable of defeating both high performance aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles, it is the only operational air defense system that can shoot down attacking missiles. A PATRIOT battery (i.e., the basic firing unit) consists of a phased array radar, an engagement control station, computers, power generating equipment, and up to eight launchers, each of which holds four ready-to-fire missiles. There are about 100 soldiers assigned to a battery, but three soldiers in the engagement control station are the only personnel required to operate the battery in combat. In addition to U.S. units, the PATRIOT is deployed with the military forces of Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Without a doubt, the PATRIOT was the most spectacular and well-known of the U.S. Army missiles used in SWA. Not long after its first combat firing in January 1991, the system became known worldwide as the "Scudbuster" because of its highly publicized, visually impressive use against Iraq's most potent weapon of fear: the Iraqi-modified, Soviet-made Scud-B surface-to- surface missile capable of carrying chemical warheads. The first PATRIOT unit to deploy to Saudi Arabia--Battery B, 2d Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery, 11th ADA Brigade--arrived in country on 13 August 1990. Less than 5 months later, at 0448 on 18 January 1991, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 7th ADA, 11th ADA Brigade "...shot down the first tactical ballistic missile in Saudi Arabia. It was the first combat kill for Patriot." Not only was "this the first time a Patriot [had] been fired in anger,...it [was] the very first time one missile in combat [had] engaged and killed another missile." During the 6-week Gulf War campaign, 158 PATRIOT missiles were launched to intercept Iraqi Scud missiles. |
PATRIOT
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Initially, Army sources claimed an interception success rate of 95 percent for both Saudi Arabia and Israel.The Army has subsequently revised this figure downward to a 70 percent success rate for Saudi Arabia and a 40 percent rate for Israel. Because of the system's high visibility and the numerous accolades which it received throughout ODS and afterwards, the PATRIOT has become the most highly criticized of all the weapon systems used in SWA. A special report released by the Center for International and Security Policy Studies not long after the cessation of hostilities stated that although the PATRIOT "...demonstrated, for the first time in combat, that it is possible 'to hit a bullet with a bullet,' ...the interceptions also demonstrated the limits of the Patriot, even against a primitive ballistic missile such as the SCUD. Patriots hit the Iraqi missiles at too low an altitude and with insufficient power." This special report went on to argue in favor of the continued development of the U.S.-funded, Israeli-designed and developed ARROW, "a true ATBM [antitactical ballistic missile]...."
Almost a year after Operation Desert Storm, critics of the missile claimed that "...the Patriot success story, a `Massachusetts miracle,' is sadly not based on supportable fact." According to a recent article in The Boston Globe, "...[There] is mounting evidence that the missile, the supposed high-tech hero of the Persian Gulf War, failed repeatedly and may not have succeeded even once--and that the Army and Raytheon have been trying to discount that evidence."
Critics of the PATRIOT argued that the system "...could not prevent the deaths, injuries and considerable damage suffered by Israel from debris and warheads which were knocked off course but not destroyed by the interceptions." Perhaps the most damning, certainly the most emotionally charged, failure attributed to the system occurred on 26 February 1991 when the warhead and other debris from a Scud which broke apart in flight slammed into a metal warehouse in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The building had been converted into a barracks and mess hall for U.S. soldiers, 28 of whom died and 97 wounded as a result of the attack. This single event "...inflicted more casualties on American soldiers..." than 2 days of fighting during the ground war. Although located in an area where two batteries were set up, no PATRIOT missiles were ever fired at the incoming Scud. (Editor's note: No PATRIOT missiles were fired to intercept those SCUD missiles determined to be harmless, i.e., headed for the ocean or unpopulated desert areas.)
In the days and weeks immediately following this tragic incident, U.S. officials searched for the reasons why the PATRIOT system was not employed to protect America's own. Preliminary analyses blamed "a breakdown in the U.S. intelligence warning system..." which failed to detect the Scud's launch from southern Iraq. Heavy cloud cover and the breakup of the missile were the reasons cited for the failure. Later, "a combination of bad weather, smoke and burning oil fields in Kuwait..." were singled out as the main factors contributing to the electronic confusion which prevented the launching of PATRIOT interceptors. In March 1991, Army officials revealed that one of the two PATRIOT batteries situated near the destroyed barracks was not operational during the fatal attack because it was undergoing periodic maintenance. Two months later, newspaper accounts reported that Army investigators had ascertained that the second battery's failure to detect the incoming Scud was the result of "...multiple computer problems, including four days of continuous operation...." Actually, the investigators had known within 3 days of the tragedy that a technical problem was at the root of the PATRIOT system's nonperformance, but it took several more weeks to pin point the precise software glitch responsible for the malfunction. In February 1992, a Government Accounting Office (GAO) report confirmed that "...the failure could have been averted... if U.S. Army operators had received instructions to reset the system every few hours." The GAO findings supported "...an earlier Army conclusion that a communications snafu, rather than an inherent flaw in the Patriot system, was the main cause of the disaster...."
Despite this tragic occurrence, many of the men and women stationed in SWA, even those in Dhahran on the night of the fatal Scud attack, maintained their conviction that the PATRIOT was indeed an effective deterrent against Iraq's dreaded missiles. One Redstone Arsenal soldier who was there on the night of 26 February later described the event for the post newspaper:
"When it first hit [the building next door], there was no siren or anything. We thought it was just a Patriot hitting another Scud, knocking another Scud down. But when we went outside to check everything out, we saw the building burning.... It shocked me because I never thought I'd be so close to a place where a Scud hit. I never thought one would get through. I felt like [with] the job the Patriots had done, we'd never have a Scud to hit. I felt a lot of confidence in the Patriot--I still do, you know, it was just an unfortunate incident."
The early success of the PATRIOT system surprised many people, including most of its staunchest supporters. It also quickly silenced, at least temporarily, those critics who pointed to the system "...as a prime example of a high-tech weapon that wouldn't work and cost too much...." Despite the continuing questions about PATRIOT's performance during Operation Desert Storm, the system did the job that the Army designed it to do: namely, defending high value targets such as the airfields in Saudi Arabia from which U.S. aircraft operated. The PATRIOT was never intended to protect large densely populated areas such as those targeted by the Iraqis in Israel. As the MICOM Public Affairs Office noted, "The Patriot [is] not perfect. The Army never said it was. When it was needed, it was there. And what it did was everything the Army wanted it to do." The PATRIOT missile system influenced the course of the Gulf War by providing protection to U.S. and Saudi Arabian assets. This allowed the continuation of the air campaign on the schedule set by the coalition rather than letting allied troops be prematurely drawn into a ground war on Iraqi terms.The system also contributed significantly to the strategic and political objectives of the United States by providing the ATBM defense capability necessary to keep Israel out of the conflict. According to Assistant Secretary of the Army Stephen Conver:
"By smashing Scuds,... Patriot and its crews:
- Held the coalition of nations aligned against Iraq together;
- Proved that the government and industry can work together to give our fighting forces high-tech weapons that make a crucial difference in modern combat.
-Taught a 'lesson of persistence,' that 25 years of work were indeed worth the cost.
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The SHILLELAGH is a lightweight, surface-to-surface guided missile system which was designed as the main armament for armored combat vehicles. A direct fire missile launched from a combination gun-launcher, SHILLELAGH is effective against tanks, troops, and field fortifications. Its 152mm gun-launcher can fire either missiles or conventional ammunition and provides high accuracy against moving or stationary targets. The main armament for the SHERIDAN Assault Vehicle, the missile is guided to its target by a command system mounted on the launching vehicle. It is capable of maneuvering in flight to attack a moving target. |
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First fielded 23 years ago, the SHILLELAGH is currently used only by the U.S. Army's 82d Airborne Division. Deployed with the division during both Operation Just Cause and ODS, the SHILLELAGH was not fired in combat during the Persian Gulf conflict.
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The STINGER Reprogrammable Microprocessor (STINGER-RMP) is a manportable, shoulder- fired air defense system which provides defense for ground forces against attack by low-flying aircraft. It uses an infrared and ultraviolet homing guidance system which operates independently after the gunner aims and launches the missile. The missile homes in on the heat of the target aircraft. The Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force all use STINGER. The Army also uses the missile to arm helicopters for air-to-air combat. STINGER has been sold to Germany, Israel, Japan, and other countries. |
The first combat use of the basic STINGER weapon system by U.S. troops occurred with the deployment of 27 STINGER teams in the U.S. airborne assault against Cuban and local forces on the Caribbean island of Grenada on 25 October 1983. The system also proved very effective against first line Soviet combat aircraft in Afghanistan. Deployed during both Operation Just Cause and ODS, the STINGER-RMP "...provided highly mobile and lethal short range air defense protection to the maneuver forces" during the Gulf War. There were also 66 OH-58C Army scout helicopters equipped with air-to-air STINGER deployed during ODS.
Even before reaching the theater of operation, the STINGER was employed in a defensive posture. Soldiers from Headquarters Company, 4th Battalion, 68th Armor, 24th Infantry Division were detailed with the Military Sealift Command's ship Regulus "...to assist loading, unloading and escorting the ship's load of more than 700 tanks, fighting vehicles, and trucks headed for Saudi Arabia...." They were responsible for defending the ship once it entered the Persian Gulf. Among the "...weapons available for the defense of the ship were STINGER missiles...." Because of the lack of targets for most of the air defense weapons deployed to SWA, however, no STINGER-RMP missiles were fired during Operation Desert Storm.
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This is a lightweight, highly mobile and transportable surface-to-air missile/.50 caliber machine gun system. It is operated by a two-man crew for defense against helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft at low altitude in day or night operations and in clear or adverse weather. The system is mounted in a turret configuration on a HMMWV. |
The 48 AVENGERs deployed to SWA with the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Cavalry Division were instrumental during ODS combat operations. The AVENGER system "...performed exceptionally. Its operational availability exceeded all requirements. Ground force commanders relied on Avenger to provide air and ground surveillance during night and limited visibility conditions." Like most of the other air defense systems deployed to SWA, however, the AVENGER was not fired in combat because of a lack of targets.
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The TOW is a crew portable, vehicle-mounted, heavy anitarmor weapon system consisting of a launcher and one of five versions of the TOW missile. It is designed to defeat armored vehicles and other targets such as field fortifications from ranges up to 3,750 meters. After firing the missile, the gunner must keep the cross hairs of the sight centered on the target to ensure a hit. The system will operate in all weather conditions in which the gunner can see a target throughout the missile flight by using either a day or night sight. |
The TOW system is used on the HMMWV, the M151 jeep, the armored personnel carrier, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) COBRA helicopters, the ITV, and the U.S. Marine Corps light armored vehicle. Three of the five TOW missile versions--Basic TOW, Improved TOW and TOW 2--are no longer being produced for U.S. forces. However, these versions are still used by 40 allied countries. In the late 1980s, the prime contractor for the TOW weapon system began producing the TOW 2A "...which gives the capability to defeat reactive armor." The TOW 2B, which will provide "...additional capability against future armored threats, ..." began production as an engineering change proposal to the FY 1990 production contract.
In May 1972, U.S. soldiers initially used the TOW in combat during the Vietnam War. This was the very first time that American troops had ever fired an American-made missile under wartime conditions. The system has also seen action in various clashes between Israel and Syria as well as during the Iran/Iraq war. In Saudi Arabia the system was represented by [the HMMWV] with the light forces, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle with the heavy forces, Improved TOW Vehicle with some of the forces, and the Cobra-mounted version. The TOW was one of the earliest missile systems to arrive in SWA "because of the large Iraqi armored threat...[It] was deployed with some of the first units in Saudi: the 82nd Airborne Division, the 24th Mechanized Division and the101st Airborne Division.... Thousands of missiles and hundreds of launchers..." were used during Operation Desert Storm. Forces of other countries, including Saudi Arabia, also had TOW at their disposal.
Despite early reports of the problems being experienced by U.S. Army and Marine Corps units in hitting targets during live-fire exercises "...because soldiers [lacked] experience firing the weapon..." as well as Iraqi use of "...'dazzlers' intended to interfere with the guidance of Army TOW missiles and other antitank missiles," the TOW during ODS was a primary killer of Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers,and other vehicles. Before the start of the coalition air campaign in January 1991, "...Army and Marine Corps planners...noted a trend of improvement as more and more units [had] the opportunity to practice firing the TOW." The Iraqi use of dazzlers also proved to be of little concern to coalition commanders. According to Dave Harris, MICOM Public Affairs Officer, "The purpose of the dazzler is to confuse the missile guidance system so it loses track of the missile. It's a technology we knew about many years ago. It does not work against the TOWs we used in Southwest Asia.... We knew the Iraqis had these devices, but we weren't concerned about them. We've had no reports since the war that any of these were effective in any way against TOWs.
Before the start of the actual ground offensive, U.S. Marine units successfully employed the TOW against various Iraqi targets. On 18 January 1991, newspapers reported that "U.S. Marine Corps AH-1T Cobra helicopter gunships destroyed an Iraqi command post following Iraq's sporadic shelling of the Khafji area near the Saudi-Kuwaiti border.... Four Cobra gunships destroyed a building used as an Iraqi command post with TOW missiles." Accounts told by Gulf War veterans who witnessed the TOW in action during the fighting revealed several instances where TOWs "...did things that surprised the engineers who designed them more than the soldiers who fired them." TOW missiles proved to be a determining factor in the first ground engagement of Operation Desert Storm. During the Battle of Khafji, which took place before the start of the actual ground offensive, the TOW demonstrated a pretty unique ability: " ...[T]he Saudis fought Iraqi tanks with TOW missiles and drove them out of the city. At one point in the battle, the Saudis saw Iraqi soldiers on top of a water tower. Not wishing to blow up the tower, the Saudis fired a TOW, blew the ladder off the tower and left the Iraqis stranded until the end of the battle." The lethality of the TOW missile was proven beyond doubt during the 100-hour ground campaign when one of the antitank munitions fired by U.S. troops "...went right through the tank it was aimed at and penetrated another tank parked next to it.... Another TOW went through a six foot dirt berm and knocked out an Iraqi armored personnel carrier on the otherside." In both instances, the TOW performed a feat which it supposedly was incapable of accomplishing.
Even without these rather unusual and certainly unexpected displays of its effectiveness, "the TOW did fantastic, better than expected," according to Desert Storm veterans. The system's deadly accuracy proved to be unstoppable even "...out to its maximum effective range and under degraded visibility conditions." One Huntsville, Alabama, native who fought as part of a TOW/Bradley unit, related that the TOW "...was real powerful hitting because you could tell as soon as it hit, the vehicle was dead." Of the seven Iraqi vehicles destroyed by the soldier's BFV, four of the targets involved were T72 tanks, where the missile "...completely blew off the turret..." of three of the tanks. He also reported that TOW missiles were able to kill targets while the Bradley was on the move as well as cut down at least one while it was moving.
Obstacles, Challenges, Observations
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was one of the most demanding deployments in U.S. Army history in terms of both the distance involved and the speed at which a large number of troops and materiel had to be moved. The "...long air and sea lines of communication, harsh operational environment of the Southwest Asian desert, and extended duration of employment presented a formidable sustainment challenge" to the Army organizations at Redstone Arsenal.
The U.S.-led coalition effort to liberate Kuwait offered the Army a unique opportunity to demonstrate its methods and munitions as well as a chance to study how well its high-tech weaponry performed in combat. The rapidly changing requirements of modern warfare, however, placed a heavy burden on those commands whose primary missions involved the management, logistical, readiness, and acquisition support needed to maintain the operational effectiveness of the technologically sophisticated weapon systems deployed during ODS. The severe desert environment of the Persian Gulf region and the immaturity of the logistical theater of operations were two of the most formidable sustainment obstacles confronting MICOM and the PEOs for Air Defense and Fire Support, along with their respective project offices.
Environmental Stress
At the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, Army officials anticipated some problems with such environmental hazards as shimmering heat waves that might fool optical sights and antitank gunners or with dust that might hamper the functioning of laser target designators. Because its missiles are routinely tested and fired under harsh desert conditions, however, the Army expected that systems which "...have accumulated years of operating experience...in that kind of environment," would function with little difficulty in the heat and sand of Saudi Arabia.
Environmental stress to all of the Army missiles in SWA was caused by the area's periodic sandstorms and unrelenting heat. The reality of the Persian Gulf's extremely harsh surroundings elicited the observation that Army missile systems, most of which had been designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe, needed to be made more robust at extreme temperatures and under extreme environmental conditions. Among the numerous problems caused by heat, dust, and sand were the overheating of the FLIR due to failure of the internal cooling unit; exuding of cast loaded explosives for warheads due to soaking at 100o to 155o F; softening of the ablative panels on the MLRS; degrading of NICAD batteries recharging above 90o F; loss of warhead penetration performance at high temperatures; and possible danger during missile firings if storage and operational temperatures were too high. In addition, the AVENGER system's lenses were damaged by sand and its hand held display blanked out in the sunlight. The internal temperatures of the AVENGER trucks also soared to 130o F, "...making it difficult for soldiers to operate."
Missile Command and PEO/PM personnel both in theater and at Redstone Arsenal rose to this environmental challenge to system readiness by devising solutions or verifying fixes developed by soldiers in the field. For example, when sand and dust clogged HAWK air filters and froze MLRS cable reels, special cleaning techniques were initiated. One rather innovative approach used by soldiers assigned to a PATRIOT unit involved spraying Endust (the dusting/polishing cleaner for wooden furniture and other surfaces) on cheese cloth used to cover inlet air filters in order to capture fine dust particles. Replaced two to three times a day, the treated cloths could be washed and reused after drying for up to a week before a new piece of cloth was necessary. To alleviate the excessive temperatures inside the AVENGER truck, the STINGER Project Office contracted with a small business to design and produce an air conditioning unit for the system.
When MLRS and Army TACMS temperature caution and danger flags activated at 147o and 165o F, respectively, leading to a possible launch abort, an alternate firing sequence was implemented to circumvent the problem. Because of the high temperatures, TOW-DRAGON repairmen in SWA experienced trouble in adjusting the Night Sight Imager. Their request for help was passed on to MICOM by LARs in theater. The WSMD Close Combat Systems Office designed an imager focusing tool, a small number of which were fabricated then handcarried to SWA by the G/VLLD modification team. Other operational and storage procedures modified to alleviate environmental stress on fielded missile systems included the installation of solar shrouds; use of tarps as equipment sun protectors; retrofit of stainless steel plates; use of lens covers or other protective covering; use of sunlight-insensitive displays; and separation of components to allow for ventilation.
Logistically Immature Theater of Operations
The deployment of several sophisticated missile systems to a logistically immature theater of operations also created a whole host of challenges for MICOM, the PEOs, and the PMs. For example, the inability to purchase needed materials off the economy caused problems with the procurement of materials not readily available through the normal supply system. Some requisitions did not reach the appropriate supply source, while the aerial point of arrival was unable to distribute many of the items received. Delays in the receipt of Logistic Information Files, which were needed so units would know the status of their documents in order to properly manage their maintenance needs, also impacted readiness. The failure of previous maintenance and logistical planning training to account for the possibility of large-scale deployment to a logistically immature theater of operations also adversely affected weapon systems readiness. When many units received their notifications of deployment to SWA, insufficient emphasis was placed on logistics and maintenance. Some units, for example, deployed with some equipment in a non-operational state because maintenance was performed primarily on an "as required" basis. Consequently, maintenance necessary to bring the equipment to peak operational readiness rates had to be completed in a hurried-up fashion after the units reached Saudi Arabia. Intensive pre-deployment training also increased repair parts usage, but there was no adequate management for the replenishment of items before units shipped out to the Persian Gulf.
Additional maintenance problems involved the lack of adequate training for all Direct Support- Combat Support Company personnel as well as some deficits in required tools and special test equipment. In a logistically immature theater, problems at this level of maintenance meant that no one else could repair items, with the net result that some items were not available for tactical operations for an extended period of time. Some maintenance crews supported by MICOM LARs were also hampered by the assignment of unexpected missions once they were deployed, while others performed maintenance in the open on the sand because they did not check their tentage before deploying to SWA. Other maintenance delays were caused by the slow turnaround in the evacuation of some unserviceable repairables from the theater of operations and by lags in moving vehicles carrying technical supplies and repair parts from the port of entry to operational areas. Many of the logistical and maintenance problems encountered in SWA, however, were the result of inadequate or inapplicable planning for an operation the size of Desert Shield/Desert Storm in a theater of operations like the Persian Gulf.
Acquisition, Production, and Technical Challenges
In addition to the environmental obstacles encountered in the Persian Gulf region and the logistical immaturity of the theater of operations, MICOM, the PEOs, and the PMs had to surmount a variety of acquisition, production, and technical hurdles occasioned by the war. Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm presented all of the Army agencies connected with the missile programs managed at Redstone Arsenal with the greatest wartime challenge in their respective histories. The history of Redstone Arsenal's ODS role contains many examples of the outstanding efforts made by installation personnel in support of the soldiers deployed to SWA.
Army TACMS. Through the cooperation and dedication of the Army TACMS Project Office, the prime contractor, and the contracting officer, Army TACMS production was accelerated to support ODS. On 15 September 1990, the production contract was modified to accelerate the delivery of 20 M39 Guided Missile and Launching Assemblies from CY 1991 to CY 1990. The contract was modified again on 28 January 1991 to accelerate delivery of another 48 M39s to be completed by May 1991. When Operation Desert Shield began in August 1990, the Army only had 20 Army TACMS missiles in its inventory. "By the end of the ground war, however, LTV [the prime contractor] had assembled and shipped 105 missiles to the Middle East."
Between August 1990 and February 1991, LTV also responded on short notice to multiple requests to accelerate deliveries of Army TACMS spare parts and divert shipments of M39s for delivery to SWA in support of ODS. In addition, the contractor provided support to the Army Depot in Germany so that checkout and repair of the M39s could be accomplished quickly and returned to Saudi Arabia with minimal delay. Not only were the aforementioned accomplishments achieved with a system in an early production phase but this successful effort was completed without sacrifice to the reliability and integrity of the missile system. In fact, the Army TACMS proved to be one of the most outstanding high- tech systems deployed to SWA.
CHAPARRAL. On 30 November 1990, MICOM informed DA that the contractor would accelerate delivery of CHAPARRAL missiles in support of ODS. The contractor expected to deliver 24 missiles in January 1991 and 28 more the following month. Higher headquarters subsequently approved the accelerated delivery schedule.
HAWK. In June 1989, the U.S. Army Tank-Automative Command (TACOM) fielded a new 5-ton truck, the M-939-A2, as a replacement for the older M-809 series. The new truck had a higher road clearance than the older model thus was better suited for off-road operations. The new truck was used as the prime mover for the HAWK carrier or trailer. However, the trailer hitch pintle on the M-939-A2 is 35.5 inches above the ground, compared with the M-809's 28.75 inches. The increased angle of pull on the lunette assemblies caused excessive stress on this part of the HAWK carrier. In addition, the new truck was capable of traveling over more rugged terrain than that for which the HAWK carriers were designed. The combination of these two factors caused the lunette assemblies on a number of HAWK carriers to be cracked, bent, or destroyed after being towed by the M-939-A2 series trucks. On one occasion the missile trailer flipped after the lunette broke, destroying the three HAWK missiles it was carrying. The height of the M-939-A2 truck also prevented the driver from seeing the towed load. The Missile Command suggested a modification in how the HAWK launcher was towed by the new truck.
HELLFIRE. The HELLFIRE system, the first and last weapon fired during the war, was very effective during Operation Desert Storm. However, some problems with the system's readiness and use were encountered in conjunction with the Persian Gulf conflict. Between 9 November 1990 and 15 January 1991, the HELLFIRE Project Office offered equipment checkout assistance to units alerted for deployment to SWA. Findings from the assistance visits indicated serious readiness problems with the HELLFIRE/APACHE subsystem. Of the 54 aircraft checked by pre-deployment assistance technical represent- atives, 18 (or one- third of those checked) were found to have reduced missile launch capability; 10 launchers were found to be unserviceable. To address this problem, the project office dispatched a contractor technical representative contact team to SWA from December 1990 through January 1991. A total of 114 aircraft were checked out, with 41 HELLFIRE system defects and 14 aircraft electrical problems discovered. The team made the necessary adjustments and repairs to restore the units to a high readiness posture.
The technical representative team used the TS-803 contractor set, which is sensitive and requires close calibration, to make its readiness evaluations. The HELLFIRE system showed shortcomings in its ability to be tested and proven operational with the existing onboard diagnostic equipment. As a result of this ODS experience, the project office began developing a combat worthy test unit for use on the deployed HELLFIRE/APACHE subsystem.
On 27 February 1991, during an attack on the Al-Hammar causeway bridge, APACHE helicopter pilots from Fort Rucker, Alabama, watched in amazement as one HELLFIRE missile "...left its launch rail and streaked up into the afternoon sky until it disappeared.... Two other missiles left the launch rails in a crazy spiral and plowed into the sand a few hundred yards away." This seemingly erratic behavior was not the result of a problem with the missiles themselves. It was indicative of a backscatter situation.
Backscatter is the term given to laser or light energy refracted for particulate matter in the air. The problem was intensified in SWA by the vast areas covered by fine sands and the need for the helicopters to hover at relatively low altitudes while locating and engaging targets. The HELLFIRE Project Office correctly diagnosed that the missiles were not behaving erratically after firing but were, in fact, following the laser beam they detected. Although all APACHE helicopter pilots had been taught to be alert for possible backscatter situations, the project office sent a contractor representative from Rockwell International Corporation to SWA to reemphasize backscatter countermeasures that would improve pilot and missile performance.
Also during ODS, there were a series of inadvertent launches experienced with the HELLFIRE missile system. The project office initiated a program to determine the exact cause of these unplanned launches as well as a modification program on the forward wiring harness of the electronic control systems processor, a major portion of the HELLFIRE launcher. The latter modification effort was tentatively scheduled to begin in June 1992 and would involve all HELLFIRE launchers in the field and in depot inventories.
HYDRA-70. The HYDRA-70 (2.75-inch) rockets continue to be a viable munition for attack helicopters against soft and medium hard targets. The MK66 motor, with its extended range coupled with a standard HEPD (high explosive point detonating) warhead, provided excellent suppressive fire to allow the HELLFIRE missiles to be managed for use on exact and hardened targets. The HYDRA-70 HEPD stock asset position at the onset of Operation Desert Shield was less than acceptable; however, through the exploration of multiple courses of action, production of these rockets was accelerated to a safe position by the beginning of Operation Desert Storm. In addition, the new HYDRA-70 multipurpose submunitions rocket, which was in production when Operation Desert Shield began, was cleared for conditional release in SWA. This new munition's performance met expectations and proved to be popular with the pilots.
MLRS. Development of protection for the exposed areas of the MLRS missile launcher system from the extremely high velocity gases resulting from rocket motor operation has been a high priority for the MLRS Project Office. Prior to ODS, only neoprene ablative panels were available to prevent burn through during firing. These panels provide protection for 108 rounds. This limitation was acceptable in peacetime with limited live fires, but imposed severe restraints in battle.
Because of this shortcoming, development of new blast protection for the MLRS to provide increased capability was given top priority. The result of this enhanced effort was stainless steel panels which afford a substantial improvement in the system's war fighting capability, cost savings, and reduction in maintenance downtime. The panel design goal of providing protection for the firing of up to 540 rockets was exceeded. During tests at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), approximately 700 rounds have been fired with no degradation of the panels.
The metal blast protection was planned for retrofit of the MLRS fleet starting in FY 1992. With the onset of ODS, however, the MLRS Project Office and the MICOM MLC took action to procure 238 retrofit kits to be delivered for application to launchers in Saudi Arabia. Expedited procurement resulted in the delivery of a total of 69 kits to SWA before the cease fire. In December 1990, a PM representative, along with seven teams from the Red River Army Depot; Mainz Army Depot; MICOM RD&E Center; and LTV Corporation, went to Saudi Arabia to apply the kits. The teams successfully completed 59 of the available launchers before the beginning of the ground offensive in February 1991.
PATRIOT. The Air Defense PEO and MICOM successfully supported deployment of the PATRIOT missile system to increase the U.S. defense posture in Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey. Within days of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the first PATRIOT fire units were mobilized at Fort Bliss, Texas, and airlifted to Saudi Arabia. Throughout the conflict, strategically emplaced fire units provided air defense coverage 24 hours a day. Reliability and system performance exceeded that which was expected.
Iraq's arsenal of tactical ballistic missiles posed an immediate threat to Saudi Arabia and other surrounding Middle Eastern countries. After the decision to deploy PATRIOT to SWA had been made, it became apparent that the new PAC 2 version of the PATRIOT was needed to counter the Iraqi threat. Although it was not scheduled to begin production until 1991, the PATRIOT Project Office issued orders "...to accelerate production schedules of the...[PAC 2 missile] shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a decision that put the...[office] `out on a limb' with Pentagon officials, but got the missile defense system to the Middle East in time to shoot down Scud missiles."
With the receipt of formal approval on 6 August 1990, PAC 2 production was accelerated to the point that by the following month missiles were rolling off the production line and being air transported directly to troops in SWA. The acceleration task involved the coordinated efforts of U.S. Government agencies as well as contractors in Massachusetts, Florida, Connecticut, California, Iowa, Arkansas, Alabama, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Maryland, Wisconsin, and Germany. When the first deployment alerts were issued in August 1990, "...only three pre- production PAC II missiles were ready, and they were on the...[WSMR] for testing. Some of the parts had not even begun production in the U.S." By the time the air campaign commenced on 17 January 1991, 460 PAC 2 missiles were in the hands of troops in SWA.
At the heart of Patriot operations is the software which controls the radar, missiles, communications and other critical functions. This massive integration of computer code required urgent tailoring to optimize Patriot performance to the threat and conditions of the Mideast. In addition to the accelerated delivery of PAC 2 missiles, the PATRIOT Project Office also worked non-stop to coordinate the activities necessary to upgrade the system's software to allow it to function effectively in key ODS performance areas. Normally, months of testing and processing are re- quired before new software is released. In the first seven weeks alone, the project office approved six releases of new software. Ongoing improvements to this part of the PATRIOT system "...were developed under time constraints measured in days, not months." It was just this sort of software fix (which was in the process of being applied to the PATRIOT batteries in SWA) that would have helped to prevent the fatal Scud attack on the U.S. barracks in Dhahran.
STINGER. In support of ODS, STINGER-RMP read only memory (ROM) modules with Version IV software were urgently needed to be delivered in the gripstocks being deployed with the shipments of STINGER-RMP missiles headed to SWA. The Module IV is the latest software upgrade that is programmed into the externally accessible module to provide the STINGER- RMP missile with increased accuracy. After this software upgrade was evaluated and validated, General Dynamics, the system's prime contractor, began producing Version IV STINGER-RMP modules in August 1990.
Because the Version IV module was needed immediately to support the ODS deployment schedule, as well as to replace modules in the gripstocks of hardware already fielded, the STINGER Project Office instructed the contractor to speed up delivery of the new modules. Between November 1990 and February 1991, General Dynamics produced about 4,700 Module IVs to support Army, Navy, and Marine Corps requirements. Before acceleration, the original production schedule was set at 175 modules a month. After production was stepped up, the new schedule was initially set at 100 modules a day, 7 days a week for 5 weeks.
During ODS, the STINGER Project Office initiated action to replace RMPs in those gripstocks deployed to SWA. The MSRD LARs in Saudi Arabia were trained in the procedure, transported initial quantities of RMPs to the theater of operations, and began the replacement program in SWA. The LARs replaced RMPs in STINGERs belonging to the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 11th ADA, and VII Corps. Another potential problem addressed by the STINGER Project Office involved those missiles equipped with rocket motors which had been releasing fragments back on the gunner during firing. To protect the gunner's eyes from possible injury, the project office procured safety glasses and shipped them to the MICOM SCR in SWA for distribution to using units. The SCR employed AMC Logistics Assistance Officers (LAOs) and MSRD LARs to dispense the glasses to the necessary units.
Before deployment to SWA, Air-to-Air STINGER systems on OH-58C/S aircraft experienced Argon bottle leakage. A fix was in process at the time of deployment. The LARs were equipped and trained on procedures for checking and repairing leaking Argon bottles in the system. All necessary actions to eliminate this problem were completed for each deployed unit.
TOW. On 9 August 1990, the TOW Project Office received word that the 82d, 101st, and 24th Divisions and the 197th Brigade would immediately deploy to SWA. The 1st Cavalry Division, elements of the 2d Armored Division, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment would follow soon thereafter. Analysis showed that, with the exception of the 82d Airborne Division, none of the deploying units had the latest version of the TOW 2 missile guidance set (MGS). The new MGS's software allowed the gunner to track a target through the optical path bending heat waves rising from the ground in a desert environment. In addition, modification kits to begin Army-wide modification of the missile case loading rails in the turret of the M-901-A1 ITV were ready for installation. This rail modification allowed TOW 2A missiles to load into ITV turrets without binding despite missile cases that were at the maximum width tolerance.
Because MICOM anticipated short notice equipment fieldings to the deploying units, the command's MLC in conjunction with Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) moved quickly to begin a 24- hour equipment modification program. The command also coordinated with TACOM for release of the ITV rail modification kits to the Anniston TOW technician's shop and established a requirement for an expedited shipping schedule. On 10 August 1990, after reviewing the status of the TOW weapon system, DA directed the TOW Project Office to apply the needed modifications immediately and to take all steps necessary to complete these modifications before the units deployed.
The TOW PM, having anticipated these directions from higher headquarters, dispatched equipment, fielding officers, and technicians to Forts Stewart and Benning in Georgia to hand off the new MGSs and to apply the ITV rail modification. Additional teams traveled to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and Fort Hood, Texas. Work at the first three installations was finished within 3 days without disrupting the deploying divisions' critical movement schedules. The Fort Hood team completed its mission on 17 August 1990. During ODS, the TOW Project Office received intelligence assessments that identified the presence of laser range-finders on Iraqi tanks that posed an eye damage threat to gunners looking through optical telescopes like those on the TOW 2 optical sight. Logisticians for the system developed a plan to apply the first deliveries of optical sight objective lenses with laser protective coating to the units that had just deployed to Saudi Arabia. The plan called for ANAD to install the protective lenses in optical sights from depot stocks which the project office would then ship to SWA in division sets. The MICOM LARs would exchange these items with the unmodified sights and then ship the latter back to ANAD for modification. Once this exchange was completed, the sights would be shipped back to SWA for use by the remaining units deployed in the theater of operations.
Once the first division set was ready for shipment, the TOW Project Office sent a fielding officer to Dover Air Force Base (AFB) to expedite shipment to SWA. Because this effort required almost all of the optical sights in depot stockage to make complete unit sets, the project office intensively managed the movement and exchange of these items. It was imperative that unmodified stocks be returned to stock once the exchange was completed. Despite an 8-day backlog of supplies awaiting airlift from Dover AFB, the TOW fielding officer was able to upgrade the priority of the sight ship- ment; the new sights reached Saudi Arabia within 5 days of leaving ANAD. From 1 October to 8 November 1990, the optical protection sight exchange program continued in SWA. All of the first TOW units deployed to Saudi Arabia had received modified sights by the end of November.
Modification of the BFV/TOW 2 subsystem MGS was pushed to provide additional capability for deployment in support of ODS. Starting on 25 October 1990, Hughes Aircraft Company modified about 1,100 MGSs and shipped them directly to FMC Corporation for installation in the A2 BFV System for ultimate deployment to SWA. The Mainz Army Depot (MZAD) performed the MGS modification for units of the 1st Armored Division, 3d Infantry Division, 3d Armored Division, and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment POMCUS (prepositioning of materiel configured to unit sets) which were deployed to SWA from Germany. A team from MZAD also made two trips to Saudi Arabia to modify MGSs in the 24th Infantry Division and any units which were missed during earlier modifications.
CHAPTER IV
OTHER MICOM-SUPPORTED SYSTEMS
DEPLOYED TO SOUTHWEST ASIA
The Army Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal supported 24 different systems in SWA during ODS. In addition to the 12 weapon systems discussed in the preceding chapter, MICOM was responsible for such systems as the FAAR, G/VLLD, ITV, and MMS. Although these systems did not garner the kind of media attention given to Redstone Arsenal's missiles and rockets, they were essential to the overall operational effectiveness of the actual munitions.
Forward Area Alerting Radar
The FAAR is a short-range air defense, low altitude early warning system. Weapons that can be used with the radar include STINGER, VULCAN, and CHAPARRAL. On 11 March 1990, DA's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS) directed that FAAR systems be removed from the Army inventory and offered to foreign military sales (FMS). Forward observer teams (i.e., soldiers with binoculars) were to provide early warning for short range air defense artillery systems until fielding of the Ground Based Sensor in the 1996-97 timeframe. As directed, the CHAPARRAL/FAAR Project Office deactivated all FAAR systems with the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), and U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC).
Because of the need for a low altitude early warning sensor in SWA, ODCSOPS sent a message on 22 October 1990 suspending the deactivation of the FAAR system, since it was the only system in the Army's inventory able to meet this ODS requirement. This decision was based on the ADA Commander's desire to deploy to SWA with the FAAR systems. The ODCSOPS message also tasked the CHAPARRAL/FAAR Project Office to upgrade the FAAR to meet ODS environmental conditions. The system's main problem was the existing carrier, the M561 GAMA GOAT, which "...was totally unsupportable from a maintenance standpoint...."
Prior to the FAAR deactivation order in March 1990, the CHAPARRAL/FAAR Project Office had spent over a year working on a FAAR carrier conversion program. That effort, of course, had ended with the Army's decision to remove the system from the field. The decision to deploy FAAR to SWA necessitated a restart of the carrier conversion effort. Because of money and time constraints, however, CHAPARRAL/FAAR engineers developed an initial conversion kit at less cost than that originally projected by the contractor. The carrier chosen for the experimental conversion unit was the 2 1/2-ton M35A2 truck. Subsequently, a total of 22 FAARs were modified by mounting the radar on a robust carrier (the M-932-A2 5-ton vehicle). The modification also included an upgraded diesel generator and a 9000 BTU air conditioner.
During hand off of the first six modified systems to the 1st Infantry Division, 2d Battalion, 3d ADA on 6 December 1990 (2 days before being deployed to SWA), the unit commander commented, "Finally they have mounted an excellent radar on a carrier that meets transportability requirements. [A] 90 to 95 percent non-mission-capable time was...[attributed] to the old M561 GAMA Goat carrier and the 5KW generator. This system can perform its mission." Another 16 modified FAAR systems were sent to SWA on 6 February 1991. This first shipment was intended to replace 16 of the 21 basic systems deployed, with the remaining 5 modified systems to be dispatched at a later date. Because of these modifications, the FAAR mounted on a 5-ton vehicle was considered to be a highly reliable, mobile and survivable ADA asset in SWA. During ODS, the system achieved an operational readiness rate of 98 percent mission capability.
Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator
The G/VLLD is used for designating moving or stationary targets for use with laser-homing weapons such as HELLFIRE. The G/VLLD can also provide accurate target information for use with conventional artillery. The system is issued to selected field artillery battalions, tank battalions, armored cavalry units, and selected infantry units. The G/VLLD is currently in production in support of National Guard requirements.
An immediate requirement arose during ODS to expedite the application of a modification to the G/VLLD systems deploying to SWA. The Missile Command's Weapon Systems Management Directorate developed a plan for replacing the old G/VLLD eyepiece with a calibrated eyesafe Laser Designator/ Rangefinder (LD/R) to protect operators against possible retinal damage caused by enemy laser systems. In November 1990, an advance team for MICOM went to Germany to modify assets of units scheduled to deploy to SWA. The team tested, repaired, and modified 107 systems. Another 98 USAREUR Theater War Reserve (TWR) systems were also modified for swap out in SWA. The Missile Command coordinated this effort through the 200th Theater Army Materiel Management Center (TAMMC), USAREUR.
A seven-member G/VLLD modification team left Redstone Arsenal Army Airfield on 10 January 1991 for Ramstein AFB, Germany, where they picked up the modified TWR assets and one more team member (the team's only civilian). Arriving in Dhahran on 11 January 1991, the team began exchanging LD/Rs on 14 January on the front lines where the Fire Support Team Vehicles (FISTVs) which carried the G/VLLDs were located. By going to the individual FISTVs, system downtime was reduced to less than 30 minutes. This effort was completed in about a month, with exchanged unmodified G/VLLDs being moved to depots in SWA where modifications could be made. In all, 187 LD/Rs and 44 modified eyepieces were swapped out. The team also left 15 additional LD/Rs at the U.S. Army Support Group as backup to the deployed units. Exchanged LD/Rs from Germany were retrograded from SWA, repaired, tested, and returned to TWR. Assets from the Continental United States (CONUS) were returned to Sacramento Army Depot for repair and return to stock.
The greatest obstacle encountered in SWA by the G/VLLD modification team was its inability to pinpoint the location of the using units. Team members drove over 14,000 miles across much of Saudi Arabia in an attempt to locate units. Many times, after arriving at the coordinates provided, the MICOM representatives discovered that the unit had moved to another location. In spite of the difficulties encountered in finding using units in the almost featureless desert terrain, the team was able to complete the exchange for all units before the beginning of the ground war.
Improved TOW Vehicle
During the first week of January 1991, AMC tasked MICOM to manage the M901-ITV. At that time, the system's SWA mission capable status was reported at 80 percent, well below the DA goal. On 10 January 1991, WSMD assembled a team with the assigned task of identifying problems and determining solutions that would improve the ITV so that DA readiness goals could be met. The directorate's ITV Readiness Team developed an action plan to improve system readiness in three major areas: readiness intelligence, critical spares, and maintenance support.
The team addressed the problems of readiness intelligence and lack of logistics information by forming a MICOM SWA Assessment Team. Once in the theater of operations, a TACOM LAR and any LARs on site with the units visited completed the team which traveled to various unit locations between 1 and 6 February 1991. The team's mission was to report on system densities, readiness, and parts requirements.
The action plan also called for the formation of opera- tional readiness floats (ORFs). A total of 44 M-901 ITVs were taken from POMCUS Theater War Reserve and shipped by rail to Nahbollenbach, Germany. There ITVs underwent rail and optical protection modifications including TOW 2 system integration and night sights. Although 10 systems were made available for immediate airlift to SWA, ARCENT would not give air shipment priority. Consequently, it was planned to move all 44 ITVs by surface to Livorno, Italy, where they would be shipped to arrive in SWA by 11 March 1991. The entire shipment was completed and fully loaded at port when the decision was made not to send them because of the ODS situation.
The critical spares portion of the action plan involved using the SWA team assessment and working with identified parts requirements. Of the 95 requisitions for not mission capable, supply (NMCS) and zero balance authorized stockage list (ASL) requirements, only 38 percent were recorded at the wholesale level. The directorate forced the remaining requisitions into the system and consolidated shipment to divisions at the Special Projects Office at Red River Army Depot (RRAD). After being combined, the parts were shipped to Charleston, South Carolina, for transport by Desert Express to SWA. Four incremental shipments were made to SWA before Class IX shipments were suspended on 8 March 1991.
Since parts requirements and wholesale requisition receipt were major problems, WSMD took action to preposition parts in SWA by requisitioning a 570-line ASL plus-up for the 321st TAMMC in SWA. The 718-item initial list was provided by the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) on 3 February 1991. It was based on National Training Center experience, failure factors, and a computer model that tailored the requirements to a 15-day combat damage requirement. Two incremental shipments of 170 and 104 parts, respectively, were made prior to the suspension of Class IX shipments.
In addition, TACOM took action to preposition eight major ITV assemblies in-country including the M-113 engine, final drive, transfer gearcase, and differential. Four items in short supply were taken from RRAD Combat Vehicle Evaluation M-901 ITVs/FISTVs that were scheduled for rebuild. These included 21 W2 turret cables, 63 hydraulic motors, 10 image transfer assembly curtains, and 21 100-amp generators. The command also had the Depot Systems Command (DESCOM) Support Group set up agreements for component repairs in SWA.
The third portion of the WSMD ITV action plan involved maintenance support. In the readiness data received, the number of vehicles listed as NMC, maintenance (NMCM) were two to three times those classified as NMCS. Turret and automotive troubles as well as a lack of parts were the most commonly mentioned problems in the NMCM category. The directorate augmented ITV maintenance by establishing Army Support Group (ASG) contact teams and ASG repair of selected ITV parts. The contact team carried parts forward from ASG to units and assisted in fixing deadlined systems and ORFs, if any. Any parts requirements which the team could not fill in theater were referred to MICOM so that parts shipments could be expedited. By the start of the ground offensive in February 1991, the ITVs were able to participate at well above the DA goal. The initial assessment of the system's performance during the "100 Hour War" showed that the ITVs had at least 14 confirmed kills.
Mast Mounted Sight
Employed on the OH-58D KIOWA helicopter, the MMS carries "...day and night acquisition sensors and laser rangefinders. They also support a highly accurate navigation system that provides precise target location data...." Those helicopters equipped with the MMS have "...a distinctive ball on top of their rotors."
Prior to the deployment of troops in support of ODS, the MICOM MLC began the A5A retrofit to improve the reliability of the system processor for the MMS. Initial retrofit efforts attempted to complete all units before they departed for SWA. However, because of the rapid call-ups and the even faster deployment, all units could not be retrofitted before shipping out.
In an effort to maintain the readiness posture of the OH-58D MMS helicopter, a Special Repair Activity (SRA) was established in the United Arab Emirates. Contractor person- nel manned the SRA and made repairs to specific assemblies and line replaceable units of the MMS system. This effort continued through May 1991.
Other MICOM-Supported Systems
Among the other systems supported by MICOM during ODS were the Manportable Common Thermal Night Sights (MCTNSs), the Modular Universal Laser Equipment (MULE), the Laser Target Designator (LTD), and the Land Combat Support System (LCSS). Each of these systems contributed to the overall coalition effort to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.
The MCTNS systems consist of electro-optical devices which use infrared light optics. They provide the soldier with the capability to see targets at night in limited visibility conditions. This equipment, valued at $47,584 per unit, has been sold to approximately 15 foreign countries.
The MULE is used for designating moving or stationary targets for the use of laser-homing weapons. The system also provides accurate information for use with conventional artillery. The MULE is used exclusively by the U.S. Marine Corps. Although the MULE is out of production, the prime contractor continues to supply selected spare parts for the system.
The LTD system is used for designating stationary or moving targets for laser homing weapons by special operation forces such as the Rangers or Special Forces. Like the MULE, the LTD is out of production, although selected spare parts are still procured from the prime contractor for the system.
The LCSS is a test set designed to support the DRAGON, LANCE, TOW, and SHILLELAGH missile systems. Its primary purpose is for field maintenance, but it can be used in a depot setting. All of the LCSS units, which each cost $2.5 million, have been deployed. There is no longer a prime contractor for this system.
CHAPTER V
MICOM FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT FOR
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM
Although the Army missile and rocket systems deployed to SWA commanded the bulk of media attention throughout the Persian Gulf conflict, without the wartime support provided by the functional elements at MICOM these systems would never have performed as they did during Operation Desert Storm. The command's military and civilian employees worked hard to ensure that "...weapon systems were in place and ready to be used in the Persian Gulf." Their dedication and unceasing concern for the welfare of the soldiers in the field paid off handsomely when the coalition air and ground campaigns began: "Various organizations...[at MICOM] did their part to support the effort.... Often this support was done without recognition. Many times people worked overtime without being asked to do so, just because they knew the extra effort was needed. Many times they toiled without a word of thanks for the role they were playing in supporting the war effort...."
Every member of the Redstone Arsenal Community can be proud of their efforts in support of the Persian Gulf War, but certain organizations bore the brunt of the burden placed on the Missile Command during ODS. Those centers and directorates responsible for logistics, readiness, and acquisition were at the fore of the MICOM wartime mobilization effort.
Logistical, Readiness & Acquisition Support
As previously mentioned, ODS was the largest deployment and combat use of Army missiles and rockets in U.S. history. The numbers of troops and materiel needed quickly to confront and contain Iraqi aggression in the Mideast severely tested the Army's logistical, readiness, and acquisition support networks. The war in the Persian Gulf subjected these support networks to the same kind of hard usage and scrutiny as that which revealed certain limitations and shortcomings in the weapon systems sent to SWA. Regulations and procedures designed for peacetime or a mature logistical theater of operations had to be bypassed temporarily or modified in order to accommodate the realities of the wartime situation in the Mideast.
The main MICOM organizations involved with this type of ODS support were the MSRD; the MLC; the Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Office; the PAD; the RD&E Center; and the Procurement Directorate. The contributions to the war effort of each of these organizations is described in the following pages.
Missile Systems Readiness Directorate. The primary mission of MSRD is to provide logistical assistance for and monitor the readiness of MICOM weapon systems. The chain of events occasioned by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 imposed severe demands on the directorate. To support ODS, 72 LARs were deployed to SWA with their units, the Reserve IMA program was implemented, and assistance was provided to the MICOM EOC on a 24-hour basis.
The directorate's Policy, Plans, and Program Division coordinated the overall MSRD response in support of ODS. Division personnel monitored and controlled all MICOM EOC taskings to ensure that the directorate's replies were appropriate, complete, and provided by or before assigned suspense dates. It was also the division's responsibility to answer inquiries involving finance or budget issues associated with the directorate's personnel and operational support for ODS. The division coordinated and administered the MICOM EOC staffing for MSRD functional representatives and shift chief requirements, which included training MSRD employees who worked in the MICOM EOC. In addition, this division provided MSRD's primary and alternate Emergency Action Officers, who were on call 24 hours a day to assist with ODS or other emer- gency requests.
The MSRD Logistic Assistance Division was heavily involved with the directorate's ODS activities because its assigned task is to provide worldwide assistance for MICOM weapon systems. A total of 51 land combat and 21 air defense LARs deployed to SWA to support 20 different missile and rocket weapon systems. In addition, four Contract Field Service Representatives (CFSRs) were sent to SWA to support the Army Helicopter Improvement Program. The logistics of these deployments required the concentrated effort of division personnel to ensure that the LARs were ready to move with the units they supported. The division developed a comprehensive rotation plan to assure that LARs were replaced with an overlap for continuity of support. Not only did the division provide technical support to the LARs in SWA, it also helped staff the MICOM EOC.
Logistic Assistance Representatives. The LARs who served in SWA constituted the primary MICOM civilian pres- ence in the theater of operations. The Army's logistic assistance program began during early World War II after officials decided that most equipment failures, problems with operation, and maintenance troubles could be traced to inexperience and "...lack of know-how." The LAR program first came to Redstone Arsenal in 1955 in support of the NIKE AJAX missile system. At that time, these civilian employees were known as missile maintenance technicians. With the creation of MSRD in July 1981, all LARs supporting Army missile units worldwide were assigned to this new MICOM organizational element.
The first MICOM representative in SWA was the LAR who arrived in-country on 11 August 1990. The men who served in this capacity during ODS lived and worked with their tactical units, providing technical expertise on the deployed Army missile systems. Their main mission was to sustain readiness by helping the troops maintain their systems, which proved to be a very challenging task in the harsh environment of the Saudi Arabian desert. Long work days were normal for most of the LARs in SWA. "In a two-week period, for example, one representative worked his normal 80 hours plus 153 hours of overtime for an average of 16.6 hours daily." Acting as the MICOM Commander's "eyes and ears in the field," the LARs were expected to report any system problems requiring resolution by MICOM or the PEOs for Air Defense and Fire Support. During the Persian Gulf conflict, however, many of the LARs went beyond their role as assistants. They began trouble- shooting and repairing systems on their own. The high state of systems readiness during ODS attests to the excellent supply and maintenance support provided by the MICOM LARs.
William H. Hollingsworth, a MICOM LAR who was in Kuwait on a 2-year tour of duty as part of a special SAMD detail, endured what was probably the most unique experience of any of the LARs in SWA. He and his wife Nancy were taken hostage by the Iraqis after the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Nancy Hollingsworth was freed from Iraqi custody on 26 August 1990, after spending the final 3 days of her captivity in Baghdad. Her husband did not return home until late October. Fortunately, Hollingsworth's Iraqi captors never learned about his missile expertise while he was still in their custody.
Although the LARs deployed to Saudia Arabia in support of ODS never had as close a brush with the Iraqis, many of them were with the troops on the front lines. They experienced the same austere living and working conditions as the soldiers. Unlike the units they supported, however, many of the LARs encountered a number of problems in getting the assistance they needed in order to do their jobs sustaining missile system readiness. Particularly in the early days of ODS, there was confusion on the part of some units as to the extent of support they were expected to provide to the LARs. Because the LARs are civilians, the commanders of some deploying units were reluctant to accept responsibility for their support, especially during hostilities. In a number of instances, living accommodations had not been pre-planned by the supported unit before the LAR was called forward. Many of these units lacked firmly established guidelines with which to address the issue.
The AMC LAOs also were not organized with the equipment needed to support the deployed LARs. The LAOs procured their materials and equipment from the units they were assigned to, so these items were not available for the LARs. Consequently, some LARs were forced "...to use the beg, borrow and secure method" to accomplish their mission. The amount of field gear needed by the individual LARs depended on where they were assigned. In most cases, all that was necessary was a sleeping bag. In other instances, a cot, an Individual Chemical Equipment pack, a protective mask, and a canteen were essential. One serious obstacle that had to be overcome was the LARs' lack of access to dedicated communications and transportation media. The capacity of both tactical and commercial media in a Third World country limited their ability to acquire or transmit information, which downgraded their ability to furnish logistics support in a timely fashion. As more units were deployed to SWA without telephone support, the Defense Switched Network (DSN) communications became severely degraded.
In addition, an administrative failure was the only reason that kept LARs from having immediate DDN access: no one contacted the host administrator to ask for the assignment of "e-mail boxes" to the representatives. The ODS Host Administrator was very helpful in getting the LARs everything they needed to get on-line, establishing a direct link via a local telephone call. The system also provided an excellent way to communicate with the supervisor in Europe. The only restrictions on use were like those anywhere else: a modem, a computer, and telephone access.
As ODS progressed, assets were made more readily available to the LARs, including tents and lumber for framing; electrical wiring; Air Force meal cards; and authorization to use Air Force/contractor gasoline stations. Also provided were a small building for telephone access, one commercial international line, two commercial local lines, and a fax machine. All of these things made the job of supporting the soldiers in SWA much easier for the LARs. By the end of the successful ground campaign, "the MICOM senior command representative... [and the] LAR supervisors...[had] repeatedly heard praise from units that had LARs assigned to them...."
Individual Mobilization Augmentees. Between 1 August 1990 and 15 January 1991, MSRD received 13 IMAs in support of ODS. From the very beginning, the system in place for calling these individuals to active duty was circumvented by the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN). Initially, MSRD was asked to submit a prioritized list of names of those individuals to be called to active duty. The directorate submitted a list of 10 IMAs, only 4 of which were called up between 4 September and 1 October 1990. Although ARPERCEN promised to call up the remaining individuals on the list within 30 days, the next group of IMAs did not report to MSRD for duty until 7 January 1991. This incremental call-up of IMAs proved troublesome for MSRD, and MICOM suggested that all IMAs identified by the primary organizational elements (POEs) in future operations should be called to active duty at one time.
During ODS, all IMAs called to active duty were funded by ARPERCEN and sent to reporting stations on a "modified" temporary duty (TDY) basis. Any further movement of the IMAs required the major subordinate command (MSC) to initiate additional TDY orders using its own fund cite and causing extra paperwork that was somewhat confusing. Because the majority of IMAs called by MSRD were warrant officers whose duty stations varied depending upon need, MICOM suggested that ARPERCEN should continue to fund Reserve Component personnel called to active duty on TDY orders with variation authorized.
Missile Logistics Center. According to one of the speakers at the ribbon-cutting ceremony for MICOM's Logistics University (LogU) on 10 April 1991, "If not for the logistics support in Southwest Asia, the outcome would have been different. I appreciate the impact you have on the availability of military systems and how well you support them." Although the pilots and soldiers who engaged the Iraqi forces in combat actually won the war, officials agreed that "...[M]any of the service members may owe their lives to the Army civilians who helped maintain the equipment and sped up the process of getting parts and other support from 60 logistics agencies at Army installations worldwide."
On 7 August 1990, MLC set up its logistics operations center (LOC) to support ODS. The LOC operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to receive and coordinate ODS actions for MLC. Staffing consisted of a shift chief, clerical support, and representatives to coordinate materiel management; maintenance engineering; Class V, DESCOM actions; and operational control. A total of 21 MLC employees worked inside the LOC, while another 17 throughout the organization were assigned to the center. The LOC was "...set up with a cross-section of people knowledgeable in supply and maintenance and ammunition and mobilization skills." Among the tasks performed by the LOC were coordinating all taskers directed to MLC; managing the release of Class V ammunition (missiles and rockets) retirements from the field; staffing special projects such as those involving surge capability for different weapons; tracking critical items; and compiling various reports.
The Missile Command is the worldwide distributor for parts and components for all of the Army's missile systems, a mission which is handled by the command's MLC. From 1 October 1989 through 31 July 1990, MLC processed 58,855 requisitions with a total value of $826.7 million. In support of ODS alone, MLC processed 23,132 requisitions between 1 August 1990 and 6 March 1991 valued at $9.09 billion. In addition to requisitions for the Persian Gulf conflict, the organization processed 55,359 requisitions totaling $1.340 billion to maintain MICOM's worldwide mission requirements during the ODS period.
Other MLC employees furnished related support to the LOC. Those individuals who worked in transportation and traffic management were responsible for scheduling and coor- dinating the movement of missiles, rockets, and spare parts from storage areas and production plants to units deploying to SWA. During ODS, MICOM Transportation accomplished the movement of 58,700 short tons of Class V materiel. This materiel was moved using both surface and air transportation. The U.S. Department of Transportation granted MICOM an exemption in order to increase the number of air carriers during this period. The Missile Command also made use of a special airlift service called Desert Express, which was initiated to provide fast delivery of high priority repair parts.
In addition to the work performed at Redstone Arsenal, various MLC employees traveled throughout the United States and to Saudi Arabia to ensure that the weapon systems deployed to SWA were ready for combat. Teams assisted units both before and after deployment, checking out equipment and helping with necessary repairs. They also supported various modification efforts undertaken to enhance the capabilities of certain systems or to counteract environmental or wartime conditions. Although MLC employees put in many long hours to support the troops in SWA, according to John Finafrock, Deputy Director of Materiel Management at MLC, "...their attitude is fantastic. Many people are doing things they've never done before, and they're quite willing to learn those things and do them well. We have people volunteering to become involved.... While some of the people are very tired, I've never seen the morale better in the directorate."
Like other MICOM organizations, however, MLC did have some obstacles to overcome in order to provide the necessary support to American soldiers in SWA. During ODS, there was no factor which could predict the failure of an item based upon extreme heat or sandy conditions. This condition caused MLC's Materiel Management Directorate (MMD) hours of manual review of operations guidelines based on "best guess" and not on actual data. The directorate suggested that this failure factor be included when an item of supply was provisioned into the system. Mortality data and multiple mobilization failure factors were needed for different operational scenarios. In addition, there was no logistics plan currently developed for real world contingency scenarios. This deficiency also caused MMD hours of additional computation work in connection with ODS. Logistics planners, working with the IMD, were able to resolve the problem. However, it would have been more efficient and timely if such a contingency plan had been in place.
Product Assurance Directorate
In support of ODS, PAD's Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) Engineering and System Assessment Division provided continuous RAM analysis and testing of the systems deployed to SWA. Analysis of ODS firing reports, malfunction reports, SCR reports, and contractor supplied information provided continuous assessment of MICOM's hardware reliability. The directorate gave weekly perform- ance briefings to ensure that the MICOM Commander was kept abreast of the latest reliability status of the missile systems deployed to the Persian Gulf.
In addition, PAD planned, developed, and initiated detailed SWA Stockpile Reliability Programs (SRPs). These programs included instrumented flight testing, component testing, sand testing, visual inspections, temperature monitoring of instrumented missiles, and analysis of annual service practice firings. Special high temperature SHILLELAGH missile firings were conducted and analyzed to determine the effects of SWA environmental conditions on missile reliability. Specific support to ODS included the location and release of dedicated TOW SRP hardware for tactical deployment and testing of G/VLLD assets prior to shipment to Saudi Arabia. The RAM Engineering and Systems Assessment Division also managed tests and analyzed data for 20 DRAGON and 60 TOW missiles.
Also during ODS, PAD expedited action on 48 technical data package (TDP) reviews; 50 requests for waiver; 9 post action awards; 200 first article/quality verification waivers; 38 first article tests; and 145 quality verification tests. The directorate supplied three clerical support personnel to the EOC, while Ammunition Surveillance Specialists from both PAD and the Redstone Arsenal Support Activity (RASA) served voluntarily in SWA for 179 days. The specialists' mission in Saudi Arabia was to oversee ammunition safety, storage, and transportation. They also investigated accidents involving ammunition and answered questions about ammunition performance.
Integrated Logistics Support Office
A continuing MICOM concern is logistic supportability in design and effective logistic support of fielded weapons. The successful fielding of supportable, affordable missile systems demands meticulous ILS management, such as that provided by the MICOM ILS Office. Working through the MICOM EOC, the ILS Office on 7 January 1991 assumed responsibility for managing the ODS Lessons Learned program. At the direction of the MICOM Commander, a MICOM ODS Lessons Learned Executive Board, chaired by the ILS Office Chief, was organized on 19 March 1991. Membership consisted of the director or deputy director of all of the primary organizational elements. Observations solicited from the MICOM community were staffed by the board as well as the PEOs/PMOs. Reviewed for content, format, and priority assignment, submitted items were consolidated, rewritten, and some deleted. The board then recommended which observations should be released to AMC and which should be assigned to MICOM for resolution.
The Missile Command submitted 68 ODS observations to AMC Headquarters; another 38 items were retained for resolution at MICOM level. The Executive Board selected 10 of the most significant observations for inclusion in the MICOM ODS After Action Report. The MICOM Chief of Staff approved these actions and tasked the appropriate organizations to resolve the items assigned to MICOM, the status of which were monitored by quarterly reports. Observations that did not pertain to AMC or MICOM were forwarded to the appropriate agencies for information or resolution.
The ILS Office also managed the ODS Good News Stories program. Working through the EOC, the office solicited stories from the Redstone Arsenal community. On 21 March 1991, the MICOM Chief of Staff approved the release of 11 stories to AMC Headquarters.
Procurement Directorate
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm presented a number of challenges to the Army's acquisition process. The Management Analysis Branch of the MICOM Procurement Directorate, which serves as the mobilization POC for the organization, was very involved with ODS activities. The branch coordinated all ODS suspenses for the directorate, established emergency procedures, and assured that all required actions were taken in a timely manner. Cost reports gathered by the branch indicated that the directorate expended 49.3 man years of regular time and 4.8 man years of overtime in support of ODS in FY 1991.
The Procurement Directorate received hundreds of ODS procurements and many existing contract delivery schedules were accelerated. Despite this sudden increase in high priority requirements and constantly fluctuating needs, the directorate was able to meet every challenge. Higher headquarters cited the directorate on numerous occasions for exceptional support in all areas.
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm had a significant impact on the Procurement Directorate's resources, one which will be felt for some time to come. A large number of unpriced contractual actions (UCAs) were issued to support ODS. This increase in UCAs will cause further workload impacts when the actions are definitized. In addition, backlogs of routine actions increased as efforts were diverted to support urgent ODS requirements. Although the entire Procurement Directorate was involved in the ODS support effort, the Repair Parts Division (Procurement Division "D") and Procurement Division "A" played major roles. From August 1990 to September 1991, the Repair Parts Division awarded 838 ODS procurement work directives (PWDs) valued at over $68 million. It also issued 141 UCAs to expedite procurements in support of ODS requirements.
The use of first article waivers and the First Article Alternate II provision for the purchase of long lead parts and production as necessary before first article approval was maximized during ODS to accelerate acquisitions. Delegation of the approval level to the Director of Procurement for use of the Alternate II provision also decreased lead time. The division established 24-hour POCs between its Quick Reaction Teams and major prime contractors to handle "blue-streak" requisitions. Numerous requirements for the PATRIOT system were expedited to meet the Desert Express by Martin Marietta and Raytheon. Expedite teams were also established to work with contractors and their vendors for back ordered items. In many cases, contract modifications were accom- plished for accelerated delivery at no increase in contract price.
Deployment of the PATRIOT system to Saudi Arabia and Israel in support of ODS had a major impact on the contracting activities of Procurement Division "A" in FY 1991. A number of letter contracts were issued for urgent requirements for hardware or services needed for ODS. Among the PATRIOT actions taken were the acceleration of PAC 2 missile deliveries, FMS sales to Saudi Arabia and Israel, retrofit of PAC 1 missiles to the PAC 2 configuration, and contractor support and repairs.
The Procurement Directorate identified two issues which created problems during ODS. The first issue involved contractor support in theater. Although the directorate successfully modified contracts to provide for the necessary support, which contractor personnel rendered as required, there were a number of questions that the directorate was unable to answer about the use of contractor personnel in a wartime situation. For example, contractors were uncertain about who sponsored them while they were in theater. They also wanted practical guidelines about transportation and protection if they had to follow equipment into a combat area.
Another issue during Operation Desert Shield concerned the limitations that current regulations impose on the use of letter contracts. In an emergency situation, it may not be practical to limit funding to 50 or 75 percent of the total amount of the contract. It also might be impossible to definitize the contract before completion of 40 percent of the work if the contract is for hardware or services that must be delivered or performed as quickly as possible.
In addition, the possibility exists that actual effort expended by the Procurement Directorate during ODS may have been under-reported to AMC. The directorate's Automated Systems Branch was tasked to track ODS PWDs, but the lack of a standard method for identifying these requirements made automatic tracking impossible. Consequently, MLC established a special priority designator to mark its ODS PWDs; however, other activities were not told to use this code. This lack of standardized coding resulted in manual tracking of PWDs generated by organizations other than MLC.
Competition Management Office
The effect of ODS on MICOM's FY 1991 competition performance was reflected in the number of sole source acquisitions recorded throughout the command. A total of $138.4 million was awarded sole source because of ODS requirements. The MICOM MLC awarded $124 million (competitive and noncompetitive) for ODS repair parts, with another $7.2 million committed to ODS. Records as of the end of FY 1991 indicate that 22.9 percent of those amounts were competitively awarded. From the start of ODS, about $45.3 million (86 Justification and Approval packages) have been processed as sole source/limited competition in support of the operation. (These figures include only those actions over $100,000.) The Competition Management Office extensively coordinated ODS requirements with MLC to obtain as much information as possible so that ODS acquisition packages could be expedited in a timely manner.
Research, Development and Engineering Center
As previously mentioned, the laser guided bombs used with such devastating effectiveness against Iraq are a modern version of a concept that MICOM's RD&E Center developed more than 25 years ago. In some respects, much of the RD&E support for ODS occurred long before the conflict ever began: work done by the center years ago helped to create the sophisticated technology used to develop the weapon systems that protected Saudi Arabia from possible invasion and ultimately liberated Kuwait. But the RD&E Center's expertise was also invaluable during the conflict in the Persian Gulf because it provided the necessary analyses and testing to sustain the operational readiness of the systems deployed to SWA. In addition to simulation, software engineering, prototype engineering, and engineering support provided to specific missile systems in SWA, the RD&E Center also handled problems in the following areas of concern.
Environmental Stress. One area of major concern during ODS addressed by the RD&E Center was the effect of the harsh SWA environment on the high-tech missile systems deployed in the area. The Systems Integration Office was the ODS POC for the RD&E Center. The office compiled a summary of high temperature environmental concerns for all MICOM weapon systems which were deployed to the Mideast. These concerns were published and distributed in theater. The office also coordinated the RD&E Center's responses to system performance issues arising out of ODS, and established the MICOM Weapon System Performance Assessment Team. This team participated in the on-site collection of Army weapon system performance data. The office also developed a questionnaire for use in determining MICOM weapon performance data. This data was the basis for evaluating deficiencies in weapon system design and developing new or improved weapon systems.
Other elements of the RD&E Center also assisted in resolving some issues raised by the climatic conditions in SWA. The Propulsion Directorate supported the various missile systems deployed during ODS by conducting extensive experimental studies on dissected shelf life and surveillance rocket motors for the prediction of service life. In addition to programmed service life experimental work, the directorate helped to ascertain degradation to deployed missiles and to predict the effects of high temperatures on structural integrity and service life. This effort involved conducting and evaluating experiments on dissected motors shipped back from the Middle East as well as providing consultative assistance. The directorate made recommendations regarding storage conditions and the safety of the motors. It also furnished data necessary for predicting the effect of expected desert temperatures on missile propellants.
The Weapon Sciences Directorate handled a number of requests for climatological background statistics and analyses of atmospheric conditions in SWA for various organizations for the duration of ODS. From November 1990 through May 1991, the directorate forwarded weekly summaries of SWA atmospheric conditions to the Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM)/ Redstone Meteorological Team for redistribution to the MICOM community. These summaries were prepared by extracting and reformatting relevant information from real-time weather data. At the request of the Propulsion Directorate, the Weapon Sciences Directorate also prepared several models of diurnal temperature and solar irradiance cycles in the SWA environment. The directorate also began work to establish quality controlled and serially complete sets of hourly meteorological parameters for simulation of long-term exposure to SWA conditions.
The Structures Directorate performed characterization of sand samples from Saudi Arabia to determine density, moisture content, chemical analyses, and particle size. The main purpose was to assess the abrasive and corrosive effects of this sand on Army equipment. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). During early February 1991, losses of allied ground assets because of air-to-ground fire by friendly aircraft occurred during Operation Desert Storm. The JCS directed that technologies to address this problem be identified and pursued with utmost speed. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was among the agencies tasked. On 12 February 1991, DARPA requested support for this effort from the RD&E Center's Guidance and Control (G&C) Directorate.
With the help of the STINGER PMO, the Redstone Technical Test Center, and BDM International, the G&C Directorate sponsored a proof of principle demonstration of air-to-ground IFF at Redstone Arsenal. This display utilized in-hand STINGER IFF interrogators and several antenna configurations for heliborne applications. The use of a fixed wing IFF interrogator was also demonstrated. The directorate provided DARPA with a detailed discussion of early demonstration findings and the fratricide problem on 20 February 1991. Within 15 days of the DARPA request, the G&C Directorate had successfully designed and demonstrated three IFF configurations.
"Blue-Gray" Threat. The Advanced Systems Concept Office (ASCO) performed two major analyses in support of ODS. Concern about the U.S. Air Force's ability to negate the ROLAND and HAWK air defense systems possessed by Iraq prompted the MICOM Deputy Commander and the PEO for Air Defense to direct analyses of means to defeat these systems technologically and operationally. The ASCO analyzed the technical configurations and quantities of the ROLAND and HAWK missiles held by Iraq, quickly updated performance studies, and forwarded recommendations to U.S. Air Force and Army elements in SWA.
APPENDIX
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
2 August 90-11 April 91
2 August 90 Iraq invades Kuwait. Kuwaiti air defense units equipped with U.S. HAWK antiaircraft missiles down about 22 Iraqi aircraft & one combat helicopter during the invasion. Iraqi forces capture U.S.-made HAWK & TOW missiles in Kuwait. U.N. Security Council Resolution 660 condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Chief of the MICOM Plans & Operation Office extends operation of the MICOM EOC to 14 hours while planning a full 24-hour manning level. William Hollingsworth, a MICOM civilian technical specialist assigned to Kuwait, and his wife Nancy are detained by the Iraqi Army.
3 August 90 The PATRIOT PM directs the prime contractor & other program subcontractors to surge production to support anticipated needs in SWA.
6 August 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 imposes economic sanctions against Iraq. Saudi Arabia requests U.S. assistance in its defense. The MICOM EOC goes to full 24-hour operation. The acceleration of PATRIOT PAC 2 missile production receives formal approval.
7 August 90 Operation Desert Shield begins (C-Day). BG Larry R. Capps, MICOM DCG, formally orders the activation of the MICOM EOC, with operations to continue on a 24-hour basis until further notice. Contractors begin the accelerated delivery schedule for PATRIOT PAC 2 missiles.
8 August 90 The first U.S. forces arrive in Saudi Arabia. AMC tasks its subordinate commands for critical items lists for surge possibilities.
9 August 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 662 declares the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait null & void. Lead Army elements from the 82d Airborne Division arrive in theater. The TOW Project Office receives word that the 82d, 101st, & 24th Divisions will deploy immediately to SWA. The 1st Cavalry Division, elements of the 2d Armored Division, & the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment would follow shortly. Analysis shows that only the 82d has the latest version of the TOW 2 missile guidance set with new software for improved tracking in a desert environment.
10 August 90 Coalition military activities in SWA are designated Operation Desert Shield. HQDA directs the TOW Project Office to immediately apply the latest software modification to the TOW 2 launchers & the ITV launch rail modification on TOW 2 systems before units deploy to SWA. Within 72 hours of their arrival in Saudi Arabia, all U.S. Air Force combat aircraft have their missile jammers upgraded to counter U.S.-made HAWK missiles captured in Kuwait by invading Iraqi forces.
11 August 90 The first MICOM LAR deployed for Operation Desert Shield arrives in SWA.
12 August 90 LTC James D. Fagan is appointed MICOM SCR for SWA.
13 August 90 The first ship departs Savannah with the equipment of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). The arrival of Battery B, 2d Battalion, 7th ADA, 11th ADA Brigade in Saudi Arabia marks the first PATRIOT battery in-country. PERSCOM begins requesting Redstone soldiers in certain specialties to fill vacancies at deploying units. Of the first 67 processed out, 33 belong to OMMCS; 9 are MICOM; 12 are TMDE.
14 August 90 The 82d Airborne Division Ready Brigade-1 arrives in theater and moves to secure ports.
17 August 90 The first U.S. Army prepositioned ship arrives in Saudi Arabia. After the TOW modification team completes its mission at Fort Hood, deploying units have the most up-to-date TOW 2 equipment available.
18 August 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 664 calls for the immediate release of foreigners from Iraq & Kuwait. The MICOM SCR for SWA arrives in Saudi Arabia.
22 August 90 By this date, CHAPARRAL/FAAR Project Office engineers have developed a new FAAR carrier conversion kit initially using a 2 1/2-ton M35A2 truck as the carrier for the radar.
25 August 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 665 authorizes the use of force to halt maritime shipping to & from Iraq.
26 August 90 The Iraqi army releases Nancy Hollingsworth, who returns to the United States.
27 August 90 U.S. Central Command now considers PATRIOT to be "in-country & functional" although hardware began arriving almost 2 weeks earlier.
29 August 90 The 82d Airborne Division arrives in theater. HQDA orders Army TACMS low rate initial production to be accelerated.
31 August 90 The first PATRIOT PAC 2 missiles roll off the production line, 5 months ahead of schedule.
10 September 90 The first group deployment from Redstone Arsenal in support of ODS involves a squad-size group of soldiers from the 95th Maintenance Company
12 September 90 Major combat elements of 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) arrive in theater.
13 September 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 666 establishes guidelines for humanitarian aid to Iraq & Kuwait.
15 September 90 The Army TACMS low rate initial production contract is modified to accelerate delivery in support of Operation Desert Shield.
16 September 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 667 condemns Iraq & demands protection of diplomatic personnel.
19 September 90 ISC-MICOM printing plant employees complete the last batch of the first printing of 250,000 copies of the pocket guide, "The Iraqi Threat and How They Fight."
24 September 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 669 authorizes the examination of requirements for economic assistance under U.N. Article 50.
25 September 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 670 condemns Iraq & confirms the economic embargo.
September 90 The first PATRIOT PAC 2 missiles produced under the accelerated production contract are air transported directly to troops in SWA.
2 October 90 ODCSOPS suspends FAAR system deactivation & tasks MICOM to bring the system to full readiness.
5 October 90 MAJ Walter E. Lorchiem is appointed MICOM SRO.
6 October 90 The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) arrives in the theater of operation.
16 October 90 Less than a month after printing an initial 250,000 copies of a guide about Iraqi troops & weapons, the ISC-MICOM printing plant prepares a second run for shipment to the Middle East.
18 October 90 MAJ Walter E. Lorcheim, a reserve officer appointed as MICOM SRO, arrives in SWA.
22 October 90 The 1st Cavalry Division, deployed with its AVENGER systems, arrives in theater.
29 October 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 condemns Iraq & calls for the release of third-country nationals & the provision of food. The Iraqi army releases William Hollingsworth, who returns to Redstone Arsenal.
October 90 Lockheed Sanders, prime contractor for the FAAR, begins converting the system to the 5-ton truck configuration in support of Operation Desert Shield. The accelerated hand off of AVENGER fire units begins in support of Operation Desert Shield.
9 November 90 The HELLFIRE Project Office offers equipment check-out assistance to HELLFIRE/APACHE units alerted for deployment to SWA. Findings from the assistance visits indicate serious readiness problems with the subsystem. MLC sends a team to SWA in support of PATRIOT. This support team will remain in theater until 18 April 91.
11 November 90 The G/VLLD Exchange Program for SWA begins in Germany to provide a calibrated eyesafe LD/R. An advance team from MICOM tests, repairs, & modifies 107 G/VLLD assets belonging to units scheduled to deploy to SWA.
18 November 90 The PEO Fire Support sends a team to SWA in support of TOW. This support team will remain in theater until 13 March 91.
21 November 90 VII Corps units begin deployment to SWA.
23 November 90 MICOM receives the order to deploy two PATRIOT fire units to Israel within 120 days.
28 November 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 677condemns Iraqi attempts to alter Kuwaiti demographics. The United States & Saudia Arabia sign an FMS case for the sale of PATRIOT fire units. Valued at more than $1 billion, it is implemented on 30 November 90. The PEO Air Defense sends a team to SWA in support of PATRIOT subsystems. This support team will remain in theater until 24 March 91.
29 November 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes the use of force to uphold resolutions unless Iraq withdraws by the 15 January 91 deadline.
30 November 90 MICOM informs HQDA that the contractor will accelerate delivery of CHAPARRAL missiles. By this date, the TOW 2 optical protection sight exchange program is completed in SWA. MLC sends another team to SWA in support of PATRIOT. This support team will remain in theater until 21 April 91.
November 90 The deployment of STINGER-RMP missiles to SWA begins. The Saudi Arabia National Guard is provided TOW night sights, giving them night fighting capability used effectively during Desert Storm.
1 December 90 The XVIII Airborne Corps arrives in the theater of operation. Initially deployed with the XVIII is the 6/27th Field Artillery Battalion, which arrives in SWA with two Army TACMS batteries.
3 December 90 SAMD sends two teams to SWA in support of MLRS & HAWK. The MLRS team returns on 6 December 90, while the HAWK team returns on 15 January 91.
14 December 90 RD&E Center sends a team to SWA in support of MLRS. This support team will remain in theater until 8 May 91.
31 December 90 A letter contract is issued for FMS customer Saudi Arabia for PATRIOT fire units & missiles.
December 90 The accelerated delivery of items under the Army TACMS low rate initial production contract modification of 15 September 90 is completed. A "Quick Fix" team deploys to SWA to modify MLRS launchers. The team installs metal panels on 70 launchers before 15 January 91. The HELLFIRE Project Office dispatches a contractor technical representative contact team to SWA to locate & make the necessary adjustments & repairs to restore the HELLFIRE/APACHE units to a high readiness posture. This effort is completed the following month.
1 January 91 The PEO Fire Support sends a team to SWA in support of HELLFIRE. This support team remains in theater until 13 January 91.
3 January 91 The AMC DCG for Materiel Readiness directs the MICOM Commanding General to coordinate with DESCOM to determine echelon above division back-up maintenance capability/capacity that could be used to reduce maintenance backlogs of the M-901 ITV.
8 January 91 The 3343d U.S. Army Hospital of Mobile, Alabama, is mobilized to augment Fox Army Community Hospital, Redstone Arsenal. The advance party arrives on 11 January; the first increment of the main body reaches Redstone on 15 January; & the final increment reports on 4 February.
10 January 91 An eight-member MICOM G/VLLD team departs Redstone Army Airfield for Dhahran.
14 January 91 The MICOM G/VLLD team begins exchanging LD/Rs on the front lines in the theater of operation.
15 January 91 The U.N. sets this date as the deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
16 January 91 By this date, the number of soldiers at Redstone Arsenal processed for possible duty in Saudi Arabia totals 225: 167 departed, 14 pending departure, the rest on standby. LTC Daniel M. Prescott, MICOM SCR, & MAJ James Fowler, MICOM SRO, arrive in SWA.
17 January 91 The Operation Desert Storm air war begins (D-Day). Laser-guided HELLFIRE missiles, fired by U.S. Army 101st Aviation Brigade APACHE helicopters strike the first coalition blow against two Iraqi early-warning radar sites, destroying both within 4 minutes thereby opening a corridor for the first air strikes against targets inside Iraq. U.S. Marine Corps AH-1T COBRA helicopter gunships destroy an Iraqi command post with TOW missiles following Iraq's sporadic shelling of the Khafji area near the Saudi- Kuwaiti border.
A total of 36 MICOM LARs and 2 supervisors are on site in Saudi Arabia by this date.
18 January 91 Iraq fires the first Scud missiles at Israel & Saudi Arabia. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 7th ADA, 11th ADA Brigade scores the first combat kill for the PATRIOT system after successfully intercepting the first Scud over Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. A Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery, attached to VII Corps, fired the first two Army TACMS missiles of Operation Desert Storm in counterattacks against Iraqi artillery at the Kuwaiti border firing on Saudi Arabia. These are the first rounds fired in anger by VII Corps since World War II as well as the first rounds fired by U.S. Army field artillery in the Persian Gulf War.
19 January 91 DOD announces the deployment of USAEUR PATRIOT missiles & crews to Israel.
20 January 91 XVIII Airborne & VII Corps (minus elements of the 3d Armored Division) begin movement to forward assembly areas for the ground phase of the campaign. MLC sends two teams to Israel in support of PATRIOT. The first team returns on 31 March 91 and the second team returns on 4 April 91.
22 January 91 WSMD sends a team to SWA in support of G/VLLD. This support team remains in theater until 2 February 91.
25 January 91 The PEO Air Defense sends a team to SWA in support of PATRIOT. This support team remains in theater until 8 February 91.
26 January 91 The VCSA directs another acceleration of PATRIOT PAC 2 missile production & delivery which is to be sustained through August 91.
28 January 91 A second acceleration of Army TACMS low rate initial production is issued.
29 January 91 Iraqi troops attack Khafji, Saudi Arabia. After AMC tasks MICOM to manage the M901 ITV, a WSMD team begins to identify problems & their solutions that result in raising system readiness rates from 80 percent to 95 percent.
30 January 91 Saudi-led coalition forces, which included U.S. Marine Corps units, storm the Iraqi-held Saudi town of Khafji, but are forced to retreat not only by Iraqi resistance but by "friendly fire" from the Qatari armored unit assigned to protect the Saudis from the rear.
31 January 91 MLC sends a team to Turkey in support of PATRIOT. This support team remains in country until 31 March 91. The second Saudi-led attack successfully retakes Khafji. During the series of fire fights constituting the first major ground battle of Operation Desert Storm, many Iraqi tanks and armored cars are reportedly immobilized by TOW antitank missiles.
January 91 MICOM LARs upgrade software packaged on STINGER-RMP gripstocks deployed to SWA.
2 February 91 LTC James D. Fagan, the first MICOM SCR in SWA, returns to Redstone Arsenal & assumes duties as senior operations officer in the MICOM EOC.
3 February 91 XVIII Airborne & VII Corps complete movement to the forward assembly areas.
6 February 91 VII Corps closes in theater with the arrival of the last elements of the 3d Armored Division.
13 February 91 Alpha Battery, 21st Field Artillery launches the first MLRS munitions to be fired in combat.
16 February 91 Coalition forces begin day & night artillery raids along front lines.
23 February 91 The deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait before the beginning of the ground war is set for 12 Noon (8 p.m. in Baghdad). The MICOM Commanding General dispatches a message on the effects of crude oil smoke on EO sensors & laser designators specifying the potential impact on operations. The PEO Air Defense sends a team to Israel in support of PATRIOT. This support team remains in country until 6 March 91.
24 February 91 Coalition forces begin the ground phase of the campaign (G-Day).
25 February 91 An Iraqi Scud missile destroys a U.S. barracks in Dhahran, killing 28 American soldiers.
27 February 91 A MICOM Quality Assurance Technician completes the task of handing off TOW 2 equipment to the Royal Saudi Land Forces.
28 February 91 President Bush orders the cessation of offensive operations.
February 91 Lockheed Sanders ships 22 FAARs in the new 5-ton truck configuration to SWA.
1 March 91 Cease fire terms are negotiated in Safwan, Iraq. TASK FORCE FREEDOM begins emergency recovery operations in Kuwait. The PATRIOT PM sends a retrograde support team to SWA. This team remains in country until 13 March 91.
2 March 91 U.N. Security Council Resolution 686 demands that Iraq cease all hostile actions & abide by the previous U.N. resolutions.
7 March 91 DOD announces the first troop deployment home.
8 March 91 Redeployment of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) begins. Class IX shipments to SWA are suspended.
March 91 The PATRIOT PAC 2 missile production acceleration effort of 26 January 91 is terminated.
March 91 By this time, MICOM Transportation had coordinated the movement of 58,700 short tons of Class V materiel in support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm.
3 April 91 U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 sets forth a permanent cease fire.
6 April 91 Iraq officially accepts U.N. cease fire terms & Security Council resolutions.
11 April 91 The cease fire takes effect.
Glossary
-A-
ACS Army Community Services
ADA air defense artillery
AFB Air Force Base
AMC U.S. Army Materiel Command
AMSAA Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
ANAD Anniston Army Depot
ARCENT U.S. Army Central Command
Army TACMS Army Tactical Missile System
ARPERCEN U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center
ASCO Advanced Systems Concept Office
ASF-C Army Stock Fund Consumable
ASG Army Support Group
ASL authorized stockage list
ATAS Air-to-Air STINGER
ATBM antitactical ballistic missile
AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network
-B-
BFV Bradley Fighting Vehicle
BG brigadier general
-C-
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
CFSR Contract Field Service Representative
COL colonel
CONUS Continental United States
CY calendar year
-D-
DA Department of the Army
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCG deputy commanding general
DDN Defense Data Network
DENTAC Dental Activity
DESCOM U.S. Army Depot Systems Command
DOD Department of Defense
DSN Defense Switched Network
-E-
EOC emergency operations center
EUSA Eighth U.S. Army
-F-
F Fahrenheit
FA field artillery
FAAR Forward Area Alerting Radar
FISTV Fire Support Team Vehicle
FLIR Forward-Looking Infrared Radar
FMS foreign military sales
FY fiscal year
-G-
GAO Government Accounting Office
G&C guidance & control
GEN general
G/VLLD Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator
-H-
HEPD high explosive point detonating
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
-I-
IFF identification friend or foe
ILS integrated logistics support
IMA Individual Mobilization Augmentee
IMD Information Management Directorate
IOTE initial operational test & evaluation
IRR Individual Ready Reserve
ISC U.S. Army Information Systems Command
ISD Intelligence & Security Directorate
ITV Improved TOW Vehicle
-J-
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
-L-
LAO Logistic Assistance Officer
LAR Logistics Assistance Representative
LCSS Land Combat Support System
LD/R Laser Designator/Rangefinder
LOC logistics operations center
LogU Logistics University
LTD Laser Target Designator
LTG lieutenant general
-M-
MCTNS Manportable Common Thermal Night Sight
MEDDAC Medical Department Activity
MGS missile guidance set
MICOM U.S. Army Missile Command
MILPO Military Personnel Office
MLC Missile Logistics Center
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MMD Materiel Management Directorate
MMS Mast Mounted Sight
MSC major subordinate command
MSFC George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
MSIC Missile & Space Intelligence Center
MSRD Missile Systems Readiness Directorate
MULE Modular Universal Laser Equipment
MZAD Mainz Army Depot
-N-
NASA National Aeronautics & Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMCM not mission capable, maintenance
NMCS not mission capable, supply
-O-
OA obligation authority
ODCSOPS Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
ODS Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
OMMCS U.S. Army Ordnance Missile & Munitions Center & School
ORF operational readiness float
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSJA Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
-P-
PAD Product Assurance Directorate
PEO program executive office/officer
PM project manager
PMO project management office(r)
POC Point of Contact
POE primary organizational element
POMCUS prepositioning of materiel configured to unit sets
P&TD Personnel & Training Directorate
PWD procurement work directive
-R-
RAM reliability, availability, maintainability
RASA Redstone Arsenal Support Activity
R&D research & development
RD&E research, development & engineering
RIF reduction in force
RMD Resource Management Directorate
RMP reprogrammable microprocessor
ROM read only memory
RRAD Red River Army Depot
-S-
SADARM Sense & Destroy Armor
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAMD Security Assistance Management Directorate
SCORE Secure Command Operations Reporting & Exercise
SCR Senior Command Representative
SEA Southeast Asia
SITREP situation report
SRA Special Repair Activity
SR0 senior readiness officer
SRP Stockpile Reliability Program
SWA Southwest Asia
-T-
TACOM U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command
TAMMC Theater Army Materiel Management Center
TDA table of distribution & allowances
TDP technical data package
TDY temporary duty
TECOM U.S. Army Test & Evaluation Command
TGSM Terminally Guided Submunition
TMDE Test, Measurement & Diagnostic Equipment
TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided
TTAD temporary tour of active duty
TWR Theater War Reserve
-U-
UCA unpriced contractual action
U.N. United Nations
U.S. United States
USAR U.S. Army Reserves
USAREUR U.S. Army, Europe
USARPAC U.S. Army, Pacific
-W-
WSMD Weapon Systems Management Directorate
WSMR White Sands Missile Range
WWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and Control System